Documents / FOIA release

/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …fly, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems was the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti- tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell's weather research cover re…
  • p. 138 …Then in January 1960, the commander of Detachment B, raised an important question that had never…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threatening as the blockade of 1948-49, President…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig- inal U-2s with the J75 engines." Detachment C…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on I May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo- graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pilots never flew…
  • p. 264 Sratrt.11/Qt2.1....31■1 Chapter 5 251 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED There was never another Agency…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabilizers.'4 THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be- fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the J58 was never used in a Navy aircraft. OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and locktin modes, a fact that…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …Yet, the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
Chapter 1
24
Allen F Donovan
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Baker also chaired the next meeting of the Air Force's
Intelligence Systems Panel in late April 1954 but could not tell its
members about the British overflight of Kapustin Yar because they
were not cleared for this information. The panel did, however, discuss
the modifications for high-altitude flight being made to the US
Canberra, the B-57.3'
The Intelligence Systems Panel and the CL-282
The next Intelligence Systems Panel meeting took place on 24 and 25
May at Boston University and the Polaroid Corporation. Panel mem-
ber Allen F. Donovan from the Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory eval-
uated the changes being made to the B-57 by the Martin Aircraft
Company. Even without Martin's specifications or drawings,
Donovan had been able to estimate what could be done to the B-57 by
lengthening the wings and lightening the fuselage. He had determined
that alterations to the B-57 airframe would not solve the reconnais-
sance needs expressed in the BEACON HILL Report. Theoretically,
he explained to the panel, any multiengine aircraft built according to
military specifications, including the B-57. would be too heavy to fly
above 65,000 feet and hence would be vulnerable to Soviet intercep-
tion. To be safe, Donovan explained, penetrating aircraft would need
to fly above 70,000 feet for the entire mission.''
Development of such an aircraft was already under way,
Donovan continued, for Philip Strong of the CIA had told him that the
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation had designed a lightweight, high-fly-
ing aircraft. ISP chairman Baker then urged Donovan to travel to
southern California to evaluate the Lockheed design and gather ideas
on high-altitude aircraft from other aircraft manufacturers.
When he was finally able to make this trip in late summer,
Donovan found the plane that he and the other ISP members had been
seeking. On the afternoon of 2 August 1954, Donovan met with L.
Eugene Root, an old Air Force acquaintance who was now a
Lockheed vice-president, and learned about the Air Force's competi-
tion for a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft. Kelly Johnson then
showed Donovan the plans for Lockheed's unsuccessful entry. A life-
long sailplane enthusiast. Donovan immediately recognized that the
" Baker interview (S).
Donovan interview (S); Baker interview (S).
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.