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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 4 …Scientists and Overhead Reconnaissance 17 The BEACON HILL Report 17 Concern About the Danger of a…
  • p. 14 …view of the "other side of the hill." With the advent of dry film, it became…
  • p. 30 …of this new advisory body." The BEACON HILL Report In 1951 the Air Force sought even…
  • p. 31 …Their head- quarters was located over a secretarial school on Beacon Hill, which soon became the…
  • p. 32 …to implement the ideas of the BEACON HILL Report until the summer of 1953. By this…
  • p. 34 …Created in July 1953, the Intelligence Systems Panel (ISP) included several experts from the BEACON HILL…
  • p. 37 …reconnais- sance needs expressed in the BEACON HILL Report. Theoretically, he explained to the panel, any…
  • p. 41 …H. T. Friis R. Mettler A. G. Hill E. Purcell W. H. Radford E. H. Plesset…
  • p. 44 …6(dli1i>10<25Yrs since the BEACON HILL and Intelligence Systems Panel meetings. (Si James Baker…
  • p. 45 …Having participated in the BEACON HILL Study and the Intelligence Systems Panel, several Project Three members…
  • p. 344 …He headed the Beacon Hill Panel in 1952 and later became director of Lincoln Laboratories. PARANGOSKY…
  • p. 345 …of several advisory panels, including the BEACON HILL project. He helped Baker decide what cameras to…
  • p. 364 …BEACON HILL Report: Problems of Air Force Intelligence and Reconnaissance. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 15 June…
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Secret
Chapter 7
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involvement in Indochina, U-2 photo g raphy provided accurate and
up-to-date intelligence to US policymakers and field commanders, as-
sisting them in crisis management and the planning of military opera-
tions. Agency U-2s also assisted in monitorin g cease-fire agreements
in the Middle East, with operations occurring after an undeclared war
in 1970 and the 1973 Middle East war.
By the time the OXCART became fully operational, manned
strategic reconnaissance of the Soviet Union was no longer seriously
considered. The political risks were too high. especially since the
quality of intelligence from reconnaissance satellites was increasing
steadily. Thus, the OXCART's only operational use was for collecting
tactical intelligence in the Far East. Like the U-2, the OXCART g ath-
ered valuable intelligence during crisis situations. Thus, in January
1968, OXCART photography revealed the location of the USS Pueblo
and showed that the North Koreans were not preparing any
large-scale military activity in conjunction with the ship's seizure.
ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY
One very important byproduct of the CIA's manned reconnaissance
program was the many advances in technology that it generated.
Thanks to simplified covert procurement arran gements and the lack
of detailed and restricting specifications, creative desi g ners such as
Kelly Johnson produced state-of-the-art aircraft in record time. The
U-2. desi g ned to carry out reconnaissance missions for two years at
best, proved so successful that, even after its original area of activity
became too dangerous for overfli g hts at the end of four years, the air-
craft served the CIA well for another 14 years and still is in service
with other government agencies.
The OXCART is an even better example of the technological ad-
vances generated by the CIA's reconnaissance program. Although the
OXCART was designed almost 30 years ago and first flown in 1962.
its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of
this aircraft also led to the use of new materials in aircraft construc-
tion. Unfortunately. the technolo g ical breakthroughs that made the
OXCART possible took longer than expected. By the time the aircraft
was ready for operations, the missions originally planned for it were
not practicable. The tremendous technological achievement repre-
sented by the OXCART ultimately led to the aircraft's demise by in-
spiring the Air Force to purchase its own version of the aircraft. The
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.