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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 4 …Scientists and Overhead Reconnaissance 17 The BEACON HILL Report 17 Concern About the Danger of a…
  • p. 14 …view of the "other side of the hill." With the advent of dry film, it became…
  • p. 30 …of this new advisory body." The BEACON HILL Report In 1951 the Air Force sought even…
  • p. 31 …Their head- quarters was located over a secretarial school on Beacon Hill, which soon became the…
  • p. 32 …to implement the ideas of the BEACON HILL Report until the summer of 1953. By this…
  • p. 34 …Created in July 1953, the Intelligence Systems Panel (ISP) included several experts from the BEACON HILL…
  • p. 37 …reconnais- sance needs expressed in the BEACON HILL Report. Theoretically, he explained to the panel, any…
  • p. 41 …H. T. Friis R. Mettler A. G. Hill E. Purcell W. H. Radford E. H. Plesset…
  • p. 44 …6(dli1i>10<25Yrs since the BEACON HILL and Intelligence Systems Panel meetings. (Si James Baker…
  • p. 45 …Having participated in the BEACON HILL Study and the Intelligence Systems Panel, several Project Three members…
  • p. 344 …He headed the Beacon Hill Panel in 1952 and later became director of Lincoln Laboratories. PARANGOSKY…
  • p. 345 …of several advisory panels, including the BEACON HILL project. He helped Baker decide what cameras to…
  • p. 364 …BEACON HILL Report: Problems of Air Force Intelligence and Reconnaissance. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 15 June…
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Chapter 7
318
The U-2 program not only provided information on individual
Soviet weapons systems, but also helped analysts assess basic Soviet
intentions, particularly during crisis situations, as Dulles wrote in
May 1960:
Whenever the international situation becomes tense because of
a problem in some particular area, we are concerned whether
the situation might get beyond control—that someone on the
other side might suddenly and irrationally unleash big war....
Our knowledge of Soviet military preparations, however, result-
ing from the overflight program, has given us an ability to dis-
count or call the bluffs of the Soviets with confidence. We have
been able to conclude that Soviet statements were more rhetori-
cal than threatening and that our courses of action could be
carried through without serious risk of war and without Soviet
inte Ife re nce.4
Dulles closed his report on the U-2's accomplishments by put-
ting the program in perspective as part of the entire national intelli-
gence effort, noting that "in terms of reliability, of precision, of
access to otherwise inaccessible installations, its contribution has
been unique. And in the opinion of the military, of the scientists and
of the senior officials responsible for our national security it has been,
to put it simply, invaluable."
The impact of the U-2 overflights on international relations is
harder to measure. On the one hand, the intelligence they gathered
was a major factor in keeping the United States from beginning a
costly and destabilizing arms race in the late 1950s and early 1960s
by showing that the Soviet Union was not engaged in major buildups
of strategic bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles. On the
other hand, violations of Soviet airspace by U-2s strained relations
with Moscow at times and led to the collapse of the 1960 summit
meeting. On balance, however, the impact of the U-2 on superpower
relations was positive. Without the intelligence gathered by the U-2,
the Soviet Union's strategic military capabilities would have
remained a mystery, making it very difficult for the President to resist
pressure from the military, the Congress, and the public to carry out
major increases in strategic weapons, which would have poisoned
relations with the Soviet Union far more than the small number of
overflights did.
Ibid.. pp. 9-10 (TS Codeword).
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.