Documents / FOIA release
This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.
“Headquarters”18 pages
Chapter 7 317 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED The "bomber-gap" controversy was soon followed by a -mis- sile-gap" controversy, provoked by an extensive Soviet propaganda campaign that claimed a substantial Soviet lead in developing and deploying ICBMs. U-2 missions searched huge stretches of the Soviet Union along the rail network, looking for ICBMs deployed outside the known missile testing facilities. These missions enabled the CIA to conclude, as Dulles explained to Congress in May 1960, that "the Soviet ICBM program has not been and is not now a crash program; instead, it is an orderly, well-planned, high-priority program aimed at achieving an early ICBM operational capability." ' As with the controversy over Soviet bomber strength, information from U-2 photography enabled President Eisenhower to resist pressure to ac- celerate the US missile deployment program by building obsolescent liquid-fueled missiles rather than waiting to complete the develop- ment of more reliable solid-fueled missiles. U-2 missions also gathered considerable data on the Soviet Union's atomic energy program, including the production of fission- able materials, weapons development and testing activities, and the location and size of nuclear weapons stockpile sites. Such U-2 pho- tography also revealed no evidence that the Soviet Union had violated the nuclear testing moratorium. One of the greatest contributions of the U-2 program was to in- crease the capabilities of the US deterrent force. Before the U-2 over- flights, most target information was based on obsolete materials dating back to World War II or shortly thereafter. With the assistance of U-2 photography, the Defense Department could allocate weapons and crews more efficiently and identify many new targets. U-2 photos also proved invaluable in determining the precise location of targets. One further contribution to the capabilities of the US deterrent force was the information that U-2s collected on the Soviet air defense sys- tem. U-2 photography located Soviet fighter airfields and gained in- telligence on new fighter models. Special electronic intercept and recordin g equipment carried on many U-2 missions enabled the CIA to analyze the technical characteristics, operational techniques, and radar order of battle of the Soviet Union's electronic defenses. This information was vital both for planning the routes for US deterrent forces and for developing electronic countermeasures. Ibid.. p. 3 (TS Codeword). et UNCLASSIFIED
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.