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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 24 …Instead of a conventional landing gear, Johnson proposed using two skis and a reinforced belly rib…
  • p. 25 …a perceived shortcoming of the Lockheed design."' Another factor in the rejection of Kelly Johnson's…
  • p. 26 …interview by Donald E. Welzenbach, Corona del Mar. California. 20 May 1985 (S). Johnson, "Log for…
  • p. 27 …Gardner described Kelly Johnson's proposal and showed the drawings to Strong. After this meeting. Strong…
  • p. 30 …To make Kelly Johnson's revolutionary design a reality, one additional source of support was necessary…
  • p. 42 …When James Killian asked Land to head Project Three, Land had to make a major decision…
  • p. 48 …do the job in Johnson's airplane. And further, 1 overlaid a curve showing that with…
  • p. 57 …demanding, and Kelly Johnson agreed that such a move would save a lot of money. Lockheed…
  • p. 58 …a week after he had been authorized to begin the project, Kelly Johnson wrote a 23…
  • p. 69 …project staff) flew LIZ with Kelly Johnson in a small Beechcraft plane piloted by eed's…
  • p. 72 …This responsibility has placed a heavy burden on the Office of Security for establishing procedures to…
  • p. 79 …Batlin suggested the method used by Nazi war criminal Hermann Goering, a thin glass ampule containing…
  • p. 81 …Kelly Johnson used a "wet-wing" design for the U-2, which meant that fuel was…
  • p. 89 …Airspeed was such a critical factor that Kelly Johnson added a vernier adjustment to the throttle…
  • p. 162 …By late 1957, Johnson agreed that something had to be done. After a series of tests…
  • p. 276 RN Chapter 6 263 Johnson, "Archangel log," 17-24 CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED Lockheed design for a hydrogen…
  • p. 324 …OXCART did win a temporary reprieve in late November 1967. The Johnson administration decided to keep…
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Chapter 1
20
scientists. Thus, new and extremely powerful weapons were coming
into the hands of a government whose actions greatly disturbed the
leaders of the West. Only two months before the successful hydrogen
bomb test, Soviet troops had crushed an uprising in East Berlin. And,
at the United Nations, the Soviet Bloc seemed bent on causing dissen-
sion between Western Europe and the United States and between the
developed and undeveloped nations. This aggressive Soviet foreign
policy, combined with advances in nuclear weapons, led officials such
as Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to see the Soviet Union as a
menace to peace and world order.
The Soviet Union's growing military stren g th soon became a
threat not just to US forces overseas but to the continental United
States itself. In the spring of 1953, a top secret RAND study pointed
out the vulnerability of the SAC's US bases to a surprise attack by
Soviet long-range bombers24
Concern about the danger of a Soviet attack on the continental
United States grew after an American military attache sighted a new
Soviet intercontinental bomber at Ramenskoye airfield. south of
Moscow, in 1953. The new bomber was the N1yasishchev-4, later
desi g nated Bison by NATO. Powered by jet engines rather than the
turboprops of Russia's other long-ran g e bombers, the Bison appeared
to be the Soviet equivalent of the US 8-52, which was only then
going into production. Pictures of the Bison taken at the Moscow
May Day air show in 1954 had an enormous impact on the US intel-
ligence community. Unlike several other Soviet postwar aircraft, the
Bison was not a derivative of US or British designs but represented
a native Soviet design capability that surprised US intelligence ex-
perts. This new long-range jet bomber, along with the Soviet Union's
large numbers of older propeller and turboprop bombers, seemed to
pose a significant threat to the United States, and, in the summer of
1954, newspapers and magazines began publishing articles highli g ht-
ing the growing airpower of the Soviet Union. Pictures of the Bison
bomber featured prominently in such stories.''
RAND Corporation. Plans Analysis Section. "Vulnerability of U.S. Strategic Power to a
Surprise Attack in 1956." RAND Special Memorandum No. 15. Santa Monica. California:
the RAND Corporation, April 15. 1953 (TS, declassified May 1967).
"AF Cites Red Bomber Progress," Aviation Week. May 24. 1954, p. 14; "Is Russia
Winning the Arms Race?. - US News and World Report. June 18, 1954, 'pp. 28-29:
"Russia Parades Airpower as 'Big Stick'," Aviation Week. June 28. 1954. p. 15: "Red
Air Force: The World's Biggest." Newsweek, AL121.1tit 23, 1954. pp. 28-33.
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.