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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 11 …At great risk, US Air Force and Navy aircraft had been conducting peripheral reconnaissance and shallow…
  • p. 16 …As a result, in the late 1940s, the US Air Force and Navy began trying to…
  • p. 17 …Two months later, on 7 October 1952, Soviet fighter aircraft stalked and shot down a US…
  • p. 72 …agreement with the Air Force and the Navy (which at that time was also interested in…
  • p. 147 …turned to the Navy, which granted permission for Detachment C to use the Naval Air Station…
  • p. 180 …The Army, Navy, and CIA, however, doubted that any had been deployed, because none could be…
  • p. 223 …by Air Force and Navy reconnais- sance aircraft. President Kennedy used NPIC photographs to illustrate his…
  • p. 273 …Charyk, and his Navy counterpart, Garrison Norton. Designers from several air- craft manufacturers also attended some…
  • p. 283 …This engine had originally been developed for the Navy's large, jet-powered flying boat, the…
  • p. 297 …The need for additional buildings on the base was met by the Navy. Three surplus Navy…
  • p. 298 …After hearing Bissell and Holcomb's suggestion that the J58 might be used in future Navy…
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Chapter 7
315
U-2 OVERFLIGHTS OF THE SOVIET UNION
Before the first U-2 overflights in the summer of 1956, project man-
agers believed that their aircraft could fly virtually undetected over
the Soviet Union. They did not expect this advantage to last very
long, however, because they also expected the Soviets to develop ef-
fective countermeasures against the U-2 within 12 to 18 rrionths.
Recognizing that time was against them, the U-2 project managers
planned a large number of missions to obtain complete coverage of
the Soviet Union as quickly as possible. At this time, the U-2 program
focused solely on the collection of strategic intelligence.
Once operations began, however, project managers found them-
selves operating under severe constraints. Contrary to the CIA's ex-
pectations, the U-2 could not fly undetected. Its overflights led to
Soviet diplomatic protests and numerous attempts at interception. Not
wishing to aggravate the Soviet Union during periods of tension or to
harm relations during more favorable intervals, President Eisenhower
placed strict limits on overflights, personally authorizing each one
and greatly limiting their number. Yet, the President never went so far
as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in Chief, he
valued the intelligence that the U-2 overflights collected, especially at
times when the press and Congress alleged that the United States was
falling behind the Soviet Union militarily, first in bombers and then in
missiles. As a result of the President's ambivalence toward over-
flights, the years 1956-60 were marked by long periods during which
no overflights occurred, followed by brief bursts of activity.
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UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.