Documents / FOIA release

/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 24 …Advanced Development Projects Division, Burbank. California. ED 129581.131011>10<25Yrs IS1 UNCLASSIFIED
  • p. 58 …Pedlow, Burbank, California, 26 August 1988. Sbc.et UNCLASSIFIED
  • p. 85 …how to transfer Lockheed employees from Burbank to Iwithout arousing a great deal of curiosity. The…
  • p. 273 …SP-1362, "History of the OXCART Program," Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, Burbank, CA. 1 July 1968, p…
  • p. 287 …designed trailer truck that carried it from Burbank By 18 November 1959, the mockup was in…
  • p. 297 …Construction began in September 1960; a C-47 shuttle service ferried work crews from Burbank to…
  • p. 299 …The plane left Burbank on 26 February 1962 and arrived at two days later. After the…
  • p. 304 …into the engine nacelles during assembly at Burbank were sucked into the power plant during initial…
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Chapter 7
315
U-2 OVERFLIGHTS OF THE SOVIET UNION
Before the first U-2 overflights in the summer of 1956, project man-
agers believed that their aircraft could fly virtually undetected over
the Soviet Union. They did not expect this advantage to last very
long, however, because they also expected the Soviets to develop ef-
fective countermeasures against the U-2 within 12 to 18 rrionths.
Recognizing that time was against them, the U-2 project managers
planned a large number of missions to obtain complete coverage of
the Soviet Union as quickly as possible. At this time, the U-2 program
focused solely on the collection of strategic intelligence.
Once operations began, however, project managers found them-
selves operating under severe constraints. Contrary to the CIA's ex-
pectations, the U-2 could not fly undetected. Its overflights led to
Soviet diplomatic protests and numerous attempts at interception. Not
wishing to aggravate the Soviet Union during periods of tension or to
harm relations during more favorable intervals, President Eisenhower
placed strict limits on overflights, personally authorizing each one
and greatly limiting their number. Yet, the President never went so far
as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in Chief, he
valued the intelligence that the U-2 overflights collected, especially at
times when the press and Congress alleged that the United States was
falling behind the Soviet Union militarily, first in bombers and then in
missiles. As a result of the President's ambivalence toward over-
flights, the years 1956-60 were marked by long periods during which
no overflights occurred, followed by brief bursts of activity.
Se t
UNCLASSIFIED

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.