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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 9 …The struggle between the CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and…
  • p. 72 …2 missions. Access to the photographs taken by the U-2 would be strictly controlled, which…
  • p. 73 …This pact gave the Air Force responsibility for pilot selection and training, weather information, mission plotting…
  • p. 81 …Before the start of a mission, the ground crew set the counters to indicate the total…
  • p. 96 …All of the products from this project would be placed in the new control sys- tem…
  • p. 100 …This was an S-band radar used by Soviet forces for early warning and ground-controlled…
  • p. 113 …The President nevertheless maintained tight control over the program and authorized only 10 days of overflights…
  • p. 128 …the following day, whithi next U-2 mission returned from the Middle East. After quickly developing…
  • p. 140 …Welzenbach (S); Mission folder 4020 (18 Marcn n, CJJA rerar9 ITS Codeword). OSA History. chap. 4…
  • p. 142 …of the first series of U-2 missions as condu this research under a project codenamed…
  • p. 147 …not an easy task in crowded Japan.`) Detachment C began conducting missions in June 1957 after…
  • p. 191 …This revised cover story, along with a mission flight plan consistent with it, was sent to…
  • p. 196 …with Abel's "wife" (probably his Soviet control) in East Germany. In November 1961, Acting DCI…
  • p. 204 …in-the DDP in order to maintain control of his overhead reconnais- sance projects (the U…
  • p. 220 …Strongly favoring Air Force control of the U-2 missions over Cuba. the DOD representatives called…
  • p. 335 …The flood of information that the U-2 missions gathered led to a major expansion of…
  • p. 340 …In 1959 Bissell became Deputy Director for Plans but kept the reconnaissance projects under his control…
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Se771'e 'ME:W.4Q
Chapter 6
313
SUMMARY OF THE OXCART PROGRAM
Intended to replace the U-2 as a collector of strategic intelligence, the
OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was
strictly for obtaining tactical intelligence and its photographic product
contributed very little to the Agency's strategic intelligence mission.
By the time OXCART became operational, photosatellite systems had
tilled the role originally conceived for it. The most advanced aircraft
of the 20th century had become an anachronism before it was ever
used operationally.'"
The OXCART did not even outlast the U-2, the aircraft it was
supposed to replace. The OXCART lacked the quick-response capa-
bility of the smaller craft: a U-2 unit could be activated overnight, and
within a week it could deploy abroad, fly sorties, and return to home
base. The OXCART planes required precise logistic planning for fuel
and emergency landing fields, and their inertial guidance systems
needed several days for programming and stabilization. Aerial tankers
had to be deployed in advance alone an OXCART's flight route and
be provisioned with the highly specialized fuel used by the 158 en-
gines. All of this required a great deal of time and the effort -of several
hundred people. A U-2 mission could be planned and flown with a
third fewer personnel.
Although the OXCART program created a strategic reconnais-
sance aircraft with unprecedented speed. range. and altitude, the pro-
gram's most important contributions lay in other areas: aerodynamic
design, high-impact plastics, engine performance, cameras, electronic
countermeasures, pilot life-support systems, antiradar devices, use of
nonmetallic materials for major aircraft assemblies, and improve-
ments in milling, machining, and shaping titanium. In all of these ar-
eas, the OXCART pushed back the frontiers of aerospace technology
and helped lay the foundation for future "stealth - research.
On 26 January 1967 Kelly Johnson noted in his "Archanizel
I think back to 1959. bePre we started this airplane, to discussions with Dick Bissell
where we seriously considered the problem of whether there would be one more round of
aircraft behre the satellites took over. We jointly agreed there would be just one round.
and not two. That seems to have been a very accurate evaluation, as it seems that 30
SR-71s give us enough overflight reconnaissance capability and we don't need the addi-
tional 10 Oxcart aircraft.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.