Documents / FOIA release

/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 22 …Bell was still being developed.'' Air Force headquarters soon approved Martin's proposal to mod- ify…
  • p. 55 CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED E0129581.6(dlill>10<25Yrs ISI personnel divided among project headquarters, a US test…
  • p. 73 …On 3 August 1955, Dulles and Twining met at SAC headquarters in Omaha to sign the…
  • p. 74 …Speech given by Richard Bissell at CIA Headquarters, 12 October 1965 (TS Codeword). " Brig. Gen. Leo…
  • p. 102 …U-2 project officer, the Air Force Headquarters project officer, and NACA's top official, Dr…
  • p. 107 …did not have to report to higher headquarters. WRSP-1, known within the Agency as Detachment…
  • p. 117 …Late on the evening of 3 July, Bissell went to project headquarters in the Matomic Building…
  • p. 127 …The PARAMOUNT Committee worked inside PID headquarters in the Steuart Building. Composed of members from CIA…
  • p. 138 …and prom tly reported the conversation to headquarters. When details of close call reached Washington, James…
  • p. 153 …of Detachment A achieved excellent results, project headquarters had already decided that Western Europe was not…
  • p. 194 …Because the new government had not been briefed on the U-2, Project Headquarters refused to…
  • p. 205 …its own building to the new CIA Headquarters at Langley. Soon afterward, Col. Stanley W. Beerli…
  • p. 312 …that the performance of an A-12 with 175 engines (as suggested by project headquarters for…
  • p. 319 …12958 1.61111111>1010<25Yrs (Si Project Headquarters in Langley_planned and directed all operational BLACK…
  • p. 323 …Project headquarters informed Deputy Defense Secretary Vance on 10 January 1967 that the A- 12s would…
  • p. 324 …President Johnson con- firmed this decision on 21 May.'" - - Project headquarters selected 8 June 1968 as…
  • p. 334 …Air Force personnel served at all levels of the recon- naissance program, from project headquarters to…
  • p. 365 …Speech given by Richard Bissell at CIA Headquarters, 12 October 1965 (Top Secret Codeword). Interview with…
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Se771'e 'ME:W.4Q
Chapter 6
313
SUMMARY OF THE OXCART PROGRAM
Intended to replace the U-2 as a collector of strategic intelligence, the
OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was
strictly for obtaining tactical intelligence and its photographic product
contributed very little to the Agency's strategic intelligence mission.
By the time OXCART became operational, photosatellite systems had
tilled the role originally conceived for it. The most advanced aircraft
of the 20th century had become an anachronism before it was ever
used operationally.'"
The OXCART did not even outlast the U-2, the aircraft it was
supposed to replace. The OXCART lacked the quick-response capa-
bility of the smaller craft: a U-2 unit could be activated overnight, and
within a week it could deploy abroad, fly sorties, and return to home
base. The OXCART planes required precise logistic planning for fuel
and emergency landing fields, and their inertial guidance systems
needed several days for programming and stabilization. Aerial tankers
had to be deployed in advance alone an OXCART's flight route and
be provisioned with the highly specialized fuel used by the 158 en-
gines. All of this required a great deal of time and the effort -of several
hundred people. A U-2 mission could be planned and flown with a
third fewer personnel.
Although the OXCART program created a strategic reconnais-
sance aircraft with unprecedented speed. range. and altitude, the pro-
gram's most important contributions lay in other areas: aerodynamic
design, high-impact plastics, engine performance, cameras, electronic
countermeasures, pilot life-support systems, antiradar devices, use of
nonmetallic materials for major aircraft assemblies, and improve-
ments in milling, machining, and shaping titanium. In all of these ar-
eas, the OXCART pushed back the frontiers of aerospace technology
and helped lay the foundation for future "stealth - research.
On 26 January 1967 Kelly Johnson noted in his "Archanizel
I think back to 1959. bePre we started this airplane, to discussions with Dick Bissell
where we seriously considered the problem of whether there would be one more round of
aircraft behre the satellites took over. We jointly agreed there would be just one round.
and not two. That seems to have been a very accurate evaluation, as it seems that 30
SR-71s give us enough overflight reconnaissance capability and we don't need the addi-
tional 10 Oxcart aircraft.
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.