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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 9 …The struggle between the CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and…
  • p. 72 …2 missions. Access to the photographs taken by the U-2 would be strictly controlled, which…
  • p. 73 …This pact gave the Air Force responsibility for pilot selection and training, weather information, mission plotting…
  • p. 81 …Before the start of a mission, the ground crew set the counters to indicate the total…
  • p. 96 …All of the products from this project would be placed in the new control sys- tem…
  • p. 100 …This was an S-band radar used by Soviet forces for early warning and ground-controlled…
  • p. 113 …The President nevertheless maintained tight control over the program and authorized only 10 days of overflights…
  • p. 128 …the following day, whithi next U-2 mission returned from the Middle East. After quickly developing…
  • p. 140 …Welzenbach (S); Mission folder 4020 (18 Marcn n, CJJA rerar9 ITS Codeword). OSA History. chap. 4…
  • p. 142 …of the first series of U-2 missions as condu this research under a project codenamed…
  • p. 147 …not an easy task in crowded Japan.`) Detachment C began conducting missions in June 1957 after…
  • p. 191 …This revised cover story, along with a mission flight plan consistent with it, was sent to…
  • p. 196 …with Abel's "wife" (probably his Soviet control) in East Germany. In November 1961, Acting DCI…
  • p. 204 …in-the DDP in order to maintain control of his overhead reconnais- sance projects (the U…
  • p. 220 …Strongly favoring Air Force control of the U-2 missions over Cuba. the DOD representatives called…
  • p. 335 …The flood of information that the U-2 missions gathered led to a major expansion of…
  • p. 340 …In 1959 Bissell became Deputy Director for Plans but kept the reconnaissance projects under his control…
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Chapter 6
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POSSIBLE SUCCESSORS TO THE OXCART
The OXCART was the last high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft pro-
duced for the CIA, although the Office of Special Activities did
briefly consider several possible successors to the OXCART during
the mid-1960s. The first of these, known as Project ISINGLASS, was
prepared by General Dynamics to utilize technology developed for its
Convair Division's earlier FISH proposal and its new F-11 l fighter in
order to create an aircraft capable of Mach 4-5 at 100,000 feet.
General Dynamics completed its feasibility study in the fall of 1964,
and OSA took no further action because the proposed aircraft would
still be vulnerable to existing Soviet countermeasures. In 1965 a more
ambitious design from McDonnell Aircraft came under consideration
as Project RHEINBERRY (although some of the work seems to have
come under the ISINGLASS desi g nation as well). This proposal fea-
tured a rocket-powered aircraft that would be launched from a B-52
mother ship and ultimately reach speeds as high as Mach 20 and alti-
tudes of up to 200,000 feet. Because buildin g this aircraft would have
involved tremendous technical challen ges and correspondingly high
costs, the Agency was not willing to embark on such a program at a
time when the main emphasis in overhead reconnaissance had shifted
from aircraft to satellites. As a result. when the OXCART program
ended in the summer of 1968, no more advanced successor was wait-
ing in the wings—only the veteran U-2.
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UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.