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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …fly, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems was the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti- tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell's weather research cover re…
  • p. 138 …Then in January 1960, the commander of Detachment B, raised an important question that had never…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threatening as the blockade of 1948-49, President…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig- inal U-2s with the J75 engines." Detachment C…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on I May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo- graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pilots never flew…
  • p. 264 Sratrt.11/Qt2.1....31■1 Chapter 5 251 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED There was never another Agency…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabilizers.'4 THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be- fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the J58 was never used in a Navy aircraft. OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and locktin modes, a fact that…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …Yet, the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
Secreilter-OliaL
Chapter 6
311
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
3,300-foot film supply. On the other hand, the SR-71's infrared,
side-looking aerial radar, and ELINT/COMINT equipment provided
some unique intelligence not available from the A-12. Air Force plan-
ners admitted, however, that some of this equipment would have to be
sacrificed in order to provide the SR-71 with ECM gear.68
Although the flyoff had not settled the question of which aircraft
was superior, the OXCART did win a temporary reprieve in late
November 1967. The Johnson administration decided to keep both
fleets for the time being, particularly because the OXCART was actu-
ally flying missions over North Vietnam. With expenditures for the
Vietnam war rising steadily, the question of reducing the costs of
competing reconnaissance programs was bound to surface again. In
the spring of 1968, there was yet another study of the OXCART and
SR-71 programs. On 16 May 1968, the new Secretary of Defense,
Clark Clifford, reaffirmed the original decision to terminate the
OXCART program and store the aircraft. President Johnson con-
firmed this decision on 21 May.'"
- - Project headquarters selected 8 June 1968 as the earliest possi-
ble date for phasing out all OXCART aircraft. Those A-12s already
at L vere placed in storage, and the aircraft on
Okinawa were scheduled to return by 8 June. Unfortunately, tragedy
struck before this redeployment took place. On 4 June 1968 during a
test flight from Kadena to check out a new engine, an A-12 disap-
peared 520 miles east of Manila. Search and rescue missions found
no trace of the plane or its pilot, Jack W. Weeks. Several days later
the remaining two A-12s left Okinawa to join the other eight
OXCART aircraft in storage at Palmdale, California. Because the
A-12s were smaller than either of the Air Force's versions, the only
parts that could be salvaged for Air Force use were the 158 engines.
The OXCART's outstanding Perkin-Elmer camera cannot be used in
the SR-71 because the two-seater Air Force aircraft has a smaller
camera compartment than that of the A-I2. Constructed from one of
the most durable metals known to man but unable to fly for want of
engines, the OXCART aircraft are fated to remain inactive at
Palmdale for many, many years.
ED 129581.610[11>1010<25Yrs
" Information supplied by James Cunningham to Donald E. Welzenbach.
'OXCART Story, - pp. 32-33 (S); OSA History, chap. 20, pp. 143-146 (TS
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.