Documents / FOIA release

/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …fly, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems was the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti- tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell's weather research cover re…
  • p. 138 …Then in January 1960, the commander of Detachment B, raised an important question that had never…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threatening as the blockade of 1948-49, President…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig- inal U-2s with the J75 engines." Detachment C…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on I May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo- graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pilots never flew…
  • p. 264 Sratrt.11/Qt2.1....31■1 Chapter 5 251 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED There was never another Agency…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabilizers.'4 THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be- fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the J58 was never used in a Navy aircraft. OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and locktin modes, a fact that…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …Yet, the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
---SZerNISEL
Chapter 6
310
EO 129581.61[11111>1045Yrs
(Si
In spite of Helms's request and the strength of his arguments, the
Bureau of the Budget memorandum was submitted to President
Johnson. On 28 December 1966, the President approved the termina-
tion of the OXCART program by 1 January 1968.
This decision meant that CIA had to develop a schedule for an
orderly phaseout of the A-12. This activity was known as Project
SCOPE COTTON. Project headquarters informed Deputy Defense
Secretary Vance on 10 January 1967 that the A- 12s would gradually
be placed in storage, with the process to be completed by the end of
January 1968. In May 1967, Vance directed that SR-7 Is would as-
sume responsibility for Cuban overflights by I July 1967 and would
add responsibility for overflights of Southeast Asia by 1 December
1967. Until these capabilities were developed. OXCART was to re-
main able to conduct assignments on a 15-day notice for Southeast
Asia and a seven-day notice for Cuba.67
All these arrangements were made before the OXCART had con-
ducted a single operational mission, which did not occur until 31 May
1967. In the months that followed the initiation of operations in Asia.
the OXCART demonstrated its exceptional technical capabilities.
Soon some high-level Presidential advisers and Congressional leaders
began to question the decision to phase out OXCART. and the issue
was reopened.
The CIA contended that the A-12 was the better craft because it
flew higher, faster, and had superior cameras. The Air Force main-
tained that its two-seat SR-71 had a better suite of sensors, with three
different cameras (area search, spotting, and mapping), infrared de-
tectors, side-looking aerial radar, and ELINT-collection gear. In an ef-
fort to resolve this argument, the two aircraft were pitted against each
other in a flyoff codenamed NICE GIRL. On 3 November 1967, an
A-12 and an SR-71 flew identical flight paths, separated in time by
one hour, from north to south roughly above the Mississippi River.
The data collected during these missions were evaluated by repre-
sentatives of the CIA, DIA, and other Defense Department intelli-
gence organizations.
The results proved inconclusive. Both photographic systems pro-
vided imagery of sufficient quality for analysis. The A-12 Type-I
camera's 72-mile swath width and 5,000-foot film supply were supe-
rior to the SR-71 Operational Objective camera's 28-mile swath and
'OXCART Story." p. 31 (S): OSA History, p. 138 (TS Codeword).
UNCLASSIFIED

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.