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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 4 …Search for a New Reconnaissance Aircraft 8 Lockheed CL-282 Supporters and the CIA 13 Scientists…
  • p. 6 …260 Competition Between Lockheed and Convair 267 The Selection of the Lockheed Design 270 Efforts To…
  • p. 12 …excellent technical study of the U-2: Lockheed U-2 (1983). E0129581.131d111>10<25Yrs…
  • p. 21 …August 1953, OS1 records (S). " Jay Miller, Lockheed U-2, Aerograph 3 (Austin, Texas: Aerofax, 1983…
  • p. 22 …Immediately after returning to California, Carter proposed to Lockheed Vice President L. Eugene Root (previously the…
  • p. 23 …high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft Chapter 1 10 Lockheed also submit a design. Carter noted that the…
  • p. 24 …Miller, Lockheed U-2, p. 12. For more details on Kelly Johnson's original proposal. see…
  • p. 25 12 The Lockheed CL-282 CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED Chapter 1 Development Planning. According to Wienberg, General LeMay…
  • p. 26 …Despite the Air Force's selection of the X-16, Lockheed continued to work on the…
  • p. 27 …six days before the Wright Air Development Command began to evaluate the Lockheed proposal. Gardner described…
  • p. 28 …range are not as good as the Lockheed CL-282. Gardner's enthusiasm for the CL…
  • p. 29 …Few details about Dulles's precise attitude toward the proposed Lockheed reconnaissance aircraft are available, but…
  • p. 30 …At this point, the summer of 1954, Lockheed's CL-282 proposal still lacked official support…
  • p. 37 …ISP chairman Baker then urged Donovan to travel to southern California to evaluate the Lockheed design…
  • p. 39 …Thus, even though the Lockheed CL-282 had several important sources of support by September 1954…
  • p. 40 …Council.46 Project Three Support for the Lockheed CL-282 Even before the final Technological Capabilities…
  • p. 42 …Agency.49 Land learned the details of Lockheed's proposed CL-282 aircraft soon after he…
  • p. 43 …Chapter 1 30 briefly mention a Lockheed design for a high-flying aircraft at the 24…
  • p. 44 …During September and October the Project Three study group met frequently to discuss the Lockheed design…
  • p. 47 …The Lockheed super glider will fly at 70,000 feet, well out of the reach of…
  • p. 48 …Putt, to oppose the adoption of the Lockheed design. The officials ar- gued that the Bell…
  • p. 49 …He used Gardner's statement to convince Lockheed's senior management to approve the project, which…
  • p. 50 …small group of prominent scientists that the Lockheed design represented the best possible overhead reconnais- sance…
  • p. 52 …afternoon of 3 December, they Although the Lockheed CL-282 was not designated as the U…
  • p. 53 …Eventually Bissell asked who was going to pay for the airframes to be built by Lockheed…
  • p. 55 …This category in- cluded maintenance personnel from Lockheed (five per aircraft), the pilots, and support personnel…
  • p. 57 …Then on 22 December 1954, the Agency signed a letter contract with Lockheed, using the codename…
  • p. 58 …The U-2 would have a The Lockheed "Skunk Works" was named after the Kickapoo Joy…
  • p. 59 …Johnson, -A High-Altitude Reconnaissance Aircraft, - 9 December 1954, Lockheed Contract Files, OSA Records (S). UNCLASSIFIED
  • p. 61 …Reconnaissance Aircraft, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation Report 10420. 28 January 1955. pp. 7-9, OSA Recordsi \ (5…
  • p. 63 …1954, even before the CIA adopted the Lockheed proposal. Baker quickly recognized, however, that he would…
  • p. 69 …Miller, Lockheed U-2. pp. 19-20. Sè'biet UNCLASSIFIED
  • p. 74 …aircraft—remained the ex- clusive province of Lockheed:9 As a result of this agreement, CIA…
  • p. 77 …The first model of the pressure suit, used by Lockheed test pilots, made no provision for…
  • p. 79 …Geary told Culbertson that the Lockheed CL-282 was going to be known officially as the…
  • p. 81 …former director of Lockheed's Skunk Works, to Donald E. Welzenbach, 14 March 1986 (U): Miller…
  • p. 84 …7 (TS Codeword); Miller, Lockheed U-2, p. 22. OSA History, chap. 8, pp. 12-14…
  • p. 85 …how to transfer Lockheed employees from Burbank to Iwithout arousing a great deal of curiosity. The…
  • p. 88 …Colonel Yancey was in charge of six SAL pilots who were to be trained by Lockheed…
  • p. 90 …CIA, which then placed an order with Lockheed for 29 U-2s in configurations to be…
  • p. 107 …U-2 cover story stating that a Lockheed-developed aircraft would be flown by the USAF…
  • p. 143 …Lockheed mechanics had mounted the various RAINBOW devices on the prototype U-2, a Lockheed test…
  • p. 144 …Unable to restart the power plant, Lockheed test pilot Robert Sicker bailed out but was struck…
  • p. 145 …The loss of one of Lockheed's best test pilots, as well as the pro- totype…
  • p. 157 …As a substitute, Lockheed began working to develop a paint with radar-suppressant qualities, but this…
  • p. 162 …a series of tests over Edwards AFB. Lockheed began coating the 11-2s with a standard…
  • p. 188 …Although it haL refurbished by Lockheed and now had the more powerful 175 engine that would…
  • p. 200 …Beschloss claims that Powers was fired by Lockheed for criticizing the Agency in his memoirs (which…
  • p. 209 …Some poetic justice in this.' One week later Colonel Geary called to order Lockheed to up…
  • p. 211 …In May 1961, Lockheed began modifying Agency U-2s so that they could be refueled in…
  • p. 220 …story, which was that its pilots were Lockheed employees on a ferry flight to Puerto Rico…
  • p. 230 …CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED Chapter 5 Late in 1958, Lockheed began refitting the Agency's 13 remaining U…
  • p. 264 …1966 decided to place an order with Lockheed for ei g ht more aircraft to be…
  • p. 265 …Francis Gary Powers was one of the Lockheed test pilots who checked out this new aircraft…
  • p. 266 …began coming off the production line at Lockheed in-the autumn of 1968, CIA and the…
  • p. 273 …SP-1362, "History of the OXCART Program," Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, Burbank, CA. 1 July 1968, p…
  • p. 275 …Personnel at Lockheed's Skunk Works referred to these aircraft concepts as "Archangel-1," "Archangel-2…
  • p. 276 RN Chapter 6 263 Johnson, "Archangel log," 17-24 CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED Lockheed design for a hydrogen…
  • p. 280 …During the first half of 1959, both Lockheed and Convair worked to reduce the radar cross…
  • p. 281 …In early June, Lockheed submitted a design for a ground-launched aircraft known as the A…
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
---SZerNISEL
Chapter 6
310
EO 129581.61[11111>1045Yrs
(Si
In spite of Helms's request and the strength of his arguments, the
Bureau of the Budget memorandum was submitted to President
Johnson. On 28 December 1966, the President approved the termina-
tion of the OXCART program by 1 January 1968.
This decision meant that CIA had to develop a schedule for an
orderly phaseout of the A-12. This activity was known as Project
SCOPE COTTON. Project headquarters informed Deputy Defense
Secretary Vance on 10 January 1967 that the A- 12s would gradually
be placed in storage, with the process to be completed by the end of
January 1968. In May 1967, Vance directed that SR-7 Is would as-
sume responsibility for Cuban overflights by I July 1967 and would
add responsibility for overflights of Southeast Asia by 1 December
1967. Until these capabilities were developed. OXCART was to re-
main able to conduct assignments on a 15-day notice for Southeast
Asia and a seven-day notice for Cuba.67
All these arrangements were made before the OXCART had con-
ducted a single operational mission, which did not occur until 31 May
1967. In the months that followed the initiation of operations in Asia.
the OXCART demonstrated its exceptional technical capabilities.
Soon some high-level Presidential advisers and Congressional leaders
began to question the decision to phase out OXCART. and the issue
was reopened.
The CIA contended that the A-12 was the better craft because it
flew higher, faster, and had superior cameras. The Air Force main-
tained that its two-seat SR-71 had a better suite of sensors, with three
different cameras (area search, spotting, and mapping), infrared de-
tectors, side-looking aerial radar, and ELINT-collection gear. In an ef-
fort to resolve this argument, the two aircraft were pitted against each
other in a flyoff codenamed NICE GIRL. On 3 November 1967, an
A-12 and an SR-71 flew identical flight paths, separated in time by
one hour, from north to south roughly above the Mississippi River.
The data collected during these missions were evaluated by repre-
sentatives of the CIA, DIA, and other Defense Department intelli-
gence organizations.
The results proved inconclusive. Both photographic systems pro-
vided imagery of sufficient quality for analysis. The A-12 Type-I
camera's 72-mile swath width and 5,000-foot film supply were supe-
rior to the SR-71 Operational Objective camera's 28-mile swath and
'OXCART Story." p. 31 (S): OSA History, p. 138 (TS Codeword).
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.