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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 4 …Scientists and Overhead Reconnaissance 17 The BEACON HILL Report 17 Concern About the Danger of a…
  • p. 14 …view of the "other side of the hill." With the advent of dry film, it became…
  • p. 30 …of this new advisory body." The BEACON HILL Report In 1951 the Air Force sought even…
  • p. 31 …Their head- quarters was located over a secretarial school on Beacon Hill, which soon became the…
  • p. 32 …to implement the ideas of the BEACON HILL Report until the summer of 1953. By this…
  • p. 34 …Created in July 1953, the Intelligence Systems Panel (ISP) included several experts from the BEACON HILL…
  • p. 37 …reconnais- sance needs expressed in the BEACON HILL Report. Theoretically, he explained to the panel, any…
  • p. 41 …H. T. Friis R. Mettler A. G. Hill E. Purcell W. H. Radford E. H. Plesset…
  • p. 44 …6(dli1i>10<25Yrs since the BEACON HILL and Intelligence Systems Panel meetings. (Si James Baker…
  • p. 45 …Having participated in the BEACON HILL Study and the Intelligence Systems Panel, several Project Three members…
  • p. 344 …He headed the Beacon Hill Panel in 1952 and later became director of Lincoln Laboratories. PARANGOSKY…
  • p. 345 …of several advisory panels, including the BEACON HILL project. He helped Baker decide what cameras to…
  • p. 364 …BEACON HILL Report: Problems of Air Force Intelligence and Reconnaissance. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 15 June…
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
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Chapter 6
310
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In spite of Helms's request and the strength of his arguments, the
Bureau of the Budget memorandum was submitted to President
Johnson. On 28 December 1966, the President approved the termina-
tion of the OXCART program by 1 January 1968.
This decision meant that CIA had to develop a schedule for an
orderly phaseout of the A-12. This activity was known as Project
SCOPE COTTON. Project headquarters informed Deputy Defense
Secretary Vance on 10 January 1967 that the A- 12s would gradually
be placed in storage, with the process to be completed by the end of
January 1968. In May 1967, Vance directed that SR-7 Is would as-
sume responsibility for Cuban overflights by I July 1967 and would
add responsibility for overflights of Southeast Asia by 1 December
1967. Until these capabilities were developed. OXCART was to re-
main able to conduct assignments on a 15-day notice for Southeast
Asia and a seven-day notice for Cuba.67
All these arrangements were made before the OXCART had con-
ducted a single operational mission, which did not occur until 31 May
1967. In the months that followed the initiation of operations in Asia.
the OXCART demonstrated its exceptional technical capabilities.
Soon some high-level Presidential advisers and Congressional leaders
began to question the decision to phase out OXCART. and the issue
was reopened.
The CIA contended that the A-12 was the better craft because it
flew higher, faster, and had superior cameras. The Air Force main-
tained that its two-seat SR-71 had a better suite of sensors, with three
different cameras (area search, spotting, and mapping), infrared de-
tectors, side-looking aerial radar, and ELINT-collection gear. In an ef-
fort to resolve this argument, the two aircraft were pitted against each
other in a flyoff codenamed NICE GIRL. On 3 November 1967, an
A-12 and an SR-71 flew identical flight paths, separated in time by
one hour, from north to south roughly above the Mississippi River.
The data collected during these missions were evaluated by repre-
sentatives of the CIA, DIA, and other Defense Department intelli-
gence organizations.
The results proved inconclusive. Both photographic systems pro-
vided imagery of sufficient quality for analysis. The A-12 Type-I
camera's 72-mile swath width and 5,000-foot film supply were supe-
rior to the SR-71 Operational Objective camera's 28-mile swath and
'OXCART Story." p. 31 (S): OSA History, p. 138 (TS Codeword).
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.