Documents / FOIA release

/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 11 …At great risk, US Air Force and Navy aircraft had been conducting peripheral reconnaissance and shallow…
  • p. 16 …As a result, in the late 1940s, the US Air Force and Navy began trying to…
  • p. 17 …Two months later, on 7 October 1952, Soviet fighter aircraft stalked and shot down a US…
  • p. 72 …agreement with the Air Force and the Navy (which at that time was also interested in…
  • p. 147 …turned to the Navy, which granted permission for Detachment C to use the Naval Air Station…
  • p. 180 …The Army, Navy, and CIA, however, doubted that any had been deployed, because none could be…
  • p. 223 …by Air Force and Navy reconnais- sance aircraft. President Kennedy used NPIC photographs to illustrate his…
  • p. 273 …Charyk, and his Navy counterpart, Garrison Norton. Designers from several air- craft manufacturers also attended some…
  • p. 283 …This engine had originally been developed for the Navy's large, jet-powered flying boat, the…
  • p. 297 …The need for additional buildings on the base was met by the Navy. Three surplus Navy…
  • p. 298 …After hearing Bissell and Holcomb's suggestion that the J58 might be used in future Navy…
refNQEOORN
Chapter 6
308
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
USS Pueblo in Wonsan Harbor
advanced aircraft ever built was to be put out to pasture. The aban-
donment of the OXCART did not result from any shortcomings of the
aircraft; the causes lay in fiscal pressures and competition between
the reconnaissance programs of the CIA and the Air Force.
Throughout the OXCART program, the Air Force had been ex-
ceedingly helpful; it gave financial support, conducted the refueling
program, provided operational facilities at Kadena, and airlifted
OXCART personnel and supplies to Okinawa for the Vietnam and
Korean operations. Air Force orders for variants of the CIA's A-12—
the YF-12A interceptor and the SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft—had
helped lower development and procurement costs for the OXCART.
Nevertheless, once the Air Force had built up its own fleet of recon-
naissance aircraft, bud getary experts began to criticize the existence
of two expensive fleets of similar aircraft.
In November 1965, the very month that the A-I2 had been de-
clared operational, the Bureau of the Budget circulated a memoran-
dum that expressed concern about the costs of the A-12 and SR-71
programs. It questioned both the total number of planes required for
the combined fleets, and the necessity for a separate CIA fleet. The
memorandum recommended phasing out the A-12 program by
September 1966 and stopping any further procurement of the SR-71
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.