Documents / FOIA release

/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 4 …Scientists and Overhead Reconnaissance 17 The BEACON HILL Report 17 Concern About the Danger of a…
  • p. 14 …view of the "other side of the hill." With the advent of dry film, it became…
  • p. 30 …of this new advisory body." The BEACON HILL Report In 1951 the Air Force sought even…
  • p. 31 …Their head- quarters was located over a secretarial school on Beacon Hill, which soon became the…
  • p. 32 …to implement the ideas of the BEACON HILL Report until the summer of 1953. By this…
  • p. 34 …Created in July 1953, the Intelligence Systems Panel (ISP) included several experts from the BEACON HILL…
  • p. 37 …reconnais- sance needs expressed in the BEACON HILL Report. Theoretically, he explained to the panel, any…
  • p. 41 …H. T. Friis R. Mettler A. G. Hill E. Purcell W. H. Radford E. H. Plesset…
  • p. 44 …6(dli1i>10<25Yrs since the BEACON HILL and Intelligence Systems Panel meetings. (Si James Baker…
  • p. 45 …Having participated in the BEACON HILL Study and the Intelligence Systems Panel, several Project Three members…
  • p. 344 …He headed the Beacon Hill Panel in 1952 and later became director of Lincoln Laboratories. PARANGOSKY…
  • p. 345 …of several advisory panels, including the BEACON HILL project. He helped Baker decide what cameras to…
  • p. 364 …BEACON HILL Report: Problems of Air Force Intelligence and Reconnaissance. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 15 June…
refNQEOORN
Chapter 6
308
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
USS Pueblo in Wonsan Harbor
advanced aircraft ever built was to be put out to pasture. The aban-
donment of the OXCART did not result from any shortcomings of the
aircraft; the causes lay in fiscal pressures and competition between
the reconnaissance programs of the CIA and the Air Force.
Throughout the OXCART program, the Air Force had been ex-
ceedingly helpful; it gave financial support, conducted the refueling
program, provided operational facilities at Kadena, and airlifted
OXCART personnel and supplies to Okinawa for the Vietnam and
Korean operations. Air Force orders for variants of the CIA's A-12—
the YF-12A interceptor and the SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft—had
helped lower development and procurement costs for the OXCART.
Nevertheless, once the Air Force had built up its own fleet of recon-
naissance aircraft, bud getary experts began to criticize the existence
of two expensive fleets of similar aircraft.
In November 1965, the very month that the A-I2 had been de-
clared operational, the Bureau of the Budget circulated a memoran-
dum that expressed concern about the costs of the A-12 and SR-71
programs. It questioned both the total number of planes required for
the combined fleets, and the necessity for a separate CIA fleet. The
memorandum recommended phasing out the A-12 program by
September 1966 and stopping any further procurement of the SR-71
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.