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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …fly, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems was the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti- tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell's weather research cover re…
  • p. 138 …Then in January 1960, the commander of Detachment B, raised an important question that had never…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threatening as the blockade of 1948-49, President…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig- inal U-2s with the J75 engines." Detachment C…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on I May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo- graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pilots never flew…
  • p. 264 Sratrt.11/Qt2.1....31■1 Chapter 5 251 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED There was never another Agency…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabilizers.'4 THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be- fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the J58 was never used in a Navy aircraft. OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and locktin modes, a fact that…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …Yet, the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
SecreTTQ
Chapter 1
19
document on 15 June 1952, the BEACON FULL Report advocated
radical approaches to obtain the information needed for national intel-
ligence estimates. Its 14 chapters covered radar, radio, and photo-
graphic surveillance; examined the use of passive infrared and
microwave reconnaissance: and discussed the development of ad-
vanced reconnaissance vehicles. One of the report's key recommenda-
tions called for the development of high-altitude reconnaissance
aircraft:
We have reached a period in history when our peacetime knowl-
edge of the capabilities, activities and dispositions of a poten-
tially hostile nation is such as to demand that we supplement it
with the maximum amount of information obtainable through
aerial reconnaissance. To avoid political involvements, such
aerial reconnaissance must be conducted either from vehicles
flying in friendly airspace, or—a decision on this point
permitting—from vehicles whose performance is such that they
can operate in Soviet airspace with greatly reduced chances of
detection or interception. 1:
Concern About the Danger of a Soviet Surprise Attack
The Air Force did not begin to implement the ideas of the BEACON
HILL Report until the summer of 1953. By this time interest in recon-
naissance had increased after Dwight D. Eisenhower became
President in January 1953 and soon expressed his dissatisfaction with
the quality of the intelligence estimates of Soviet strategic capabilities
and the paucity of reconnaissance on the Soviet Bloc."
To President Eisenhower and many other US political and mili-
tary leaders, the Soviet Union was a dangerous opponent that ap-
peared to be moving inexorably toward a position of military parity
with the United States. Particularly alarming was Soviet progress in
the area of nuclear weapons. In the late summer of 1949, the Soviet
Union had detonated an atomic bomb nearly three years sooner than
US experts had predicted. Then in August 1953—a scant nine months
after the first US test of a hydrogen bomb—the Soviet Union deto-
nated a hydrogen bomb manufactured from lithium deuteride, a tech-
nology more advanced than the heavy water method used by US
BEACON HILL Report, pp, 164, 167-168 (C). This section of the report was written by
Allen Donovan and Louis Ridenour.
" Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword).
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.