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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …fly, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems was the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti- tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell's weather research cover re…
  • p. 138 …Then in January 1960, the commander of Detachment B, raised an important question that had never…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threatening as the blockade of 1948-49, President…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig- inal U-2s with the J75 engines." Detachment C…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on I May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo- graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pilots never flew…
  • p. 264 Sratrt.11/Qt2.1....31■1 Chapter 5 251 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED There was never another Agency…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabilizers.'4 THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be- fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the J58 was never used in a Navy aircraft. OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and locktin modes, a fact that…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …Yet, the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
"OXCART Story," p. 24 (S).
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Secre ORN
Chapter 6
302
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sufficient support. The JCS and the PFIAB supported the CIA's advo-
cacy of OXCART deployment. Top State and Defense Department of-
ficials, however, thought that the political risks of basing the aircraft
in Okinawa—which would almost certainly disclose it to the
Japanese—outweighed any gains from the intelligence the OXCART
might gather. On 12 August 1966, the divergent views were presented
to President Johnson, who upheld the 303 Committee's majority opin-
ion against deployment for the time being."
The CIA then proposed an OXCART overflight of Cuba in order
to test the aircraft's ECM systems in a hostile environment. On 15
September the 303 Committee considered and rejected this idea on
the grounds that sending OXCART over Cuba "would disturb the ex-
isting calm prevailing in that area of our foreign affairs." 37
With operational missions still ruled out, proficiency training re-
mained the main order of business. This led to improvements in mis-
sion plans and flight tactics that enabled the detachment to reduce the
time required to deploy to Okinawa from 21 days to 15. Records con-
tinued to fall to the OXCART. On 21 December 1966, a Lockheed
test pilot flew an A-12 for 16,408 kilometers over the continental
United States in slightly more than six hours, for an average speed of
2.670 kilometers per hour (which included in-flight refueling at
speeds as low as 970 kilometers per hour). This flight set a record for
speed and distance unapproachable by any other aircraft."
Two weeks later, on 5 January 1967, an A-12 crashed after a fuel
gauge malfunctioned and the aircraft ran out of fuel short of the run-
way. Pilot Walter Ray ejected but was killed when he could not
become separated from the ejection seat. To preserve the secrecy of
the OXCART program, the Air Force informed the press that an
SR-71 was missing and presumed downis loss, like the
three preceding crashes, did not result rom iculties caused by
high-speed, high-temperature flight but from traditional problems in-
herent in any new aircraft.
Proposals for OXCART operations continued to surface, and in
May 1967 the CIA forwarded a detailed request to the 303 Committee
to use the OXCART to collect strategic intelligence about a new
'"OXCART Story. •• p. 23 (S): OSA History, chap. 20. pp. 110-111 (TSo
ewor .
OSA History, chap. 20, p. 112 (TS Codeword).
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.