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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

Open the PDF at page 314 Original source ↗

“Nevers”24 pages

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …fly, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems was the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti- tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell's weather research cover re…
  • p. 138 …Then in January 1960, the commander of Detachment B, raised an important question that had never…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threatening as the blockade of 1948-49, President…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig- inal U-2s with the J75 engines." Detachment C…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on I May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo- graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pilots never flew…
  • p. 264 Sratrt.11/Qt2.1....31■1 Chapter 5 251 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED There was never another Agency…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabilizers.'4 THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be- fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the J58 was never used in a Navy aircraft. OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and locktin modes, a fact that…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …Yet, the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
Chapter 6
301
OSA History. chap. 20, pp. 90-91 (TS Codeword).
"OXCART Story," p. 21 (S).
E0 12958 1.6191111>1045Yrs
Is]
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
growing hazards confronting aerial reconnaissance of the
n three years
and the Air Force had lost numerous reconnaissance drones.
ree men agreed to go ahead with all the preparatory steps
needed for the OXCART to operate over o that it would be
ready in case the President decided to authorize such missions.
Project BLACK SHIELD, the plan for Far East operations.
called for OXCART aircraft to be based at Kadena airbase on
Okinawa. In the first phase, three planes would be flown to Okinawa
for 60-day periods, twice a year, an operation which would involve
about 225 personnel. Later there would be a permanent detachment at
Kadena. In preparation for the possibility of such operations, the
Defense Department spent $3.7 million to provide support facilities
and real-time secure communications on the island by early autumn
[0 12958 1.61M11>1045Yrs
[012950 1.6191161>101010<25Yrs
OXCART to Okinawa to overfly Southeast Asia and Although
develop-
Is)
the committee did not approve deployment, it ordeieu we
ment and maintenance of a quick-reaction capability, ready to deploy
to Okinawa within 21 days after notification.
There the matter remained for more than a year. During the first
half of 1966, DCI Raborn raised the issue of deploying the OXCART
to Okinawa at five separate 303 Committee meetings but failed to win
ret
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.