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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 9 …The struggle between the CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and…
  • p. 72 …2 missions. Access to the photographs taken by the U-2 would be strictly controlled, which…
  • p. 73 …This pact gave the Air Force responsibility for pilot selection and training, weather information, mission plotting…
  • p. 81 …Before the start of a mission, the ground crew set the counters to indicate the total…
  • p. 96 …All of the products from this project would be placed in the new control sys- tem…
  • p. 100 …This was an S-band radar used by Soviet forces for early warning and ground-controlled…
  • p. 113 …The President nevertheless maintained tight control over the program and authorized only 10 days of overflights…
  • p. 128 …the following day, whithi next U-2 mission returned from the Middle East. After quickly developing…
  • p. 140 …Welzenbach (S); Mission folder 4020 (18 Marcn n, CJJA rerar9 ITS Codeword). OSA History. chap. 4…
  • p. 142 …of the first series of U-2 missions as condu this research under a project codenamed…
  • p. 147 …not an easy task in crowded Japan.`) Detachment C began conducting missions in June 1957 after…
  • p. 191 …This revised cover story, along with a mission flight plan consistent with it, was sent to…
  • p. 196 …with Abel's "wife" (probably his Soviet control) in East Germany. In November 1961, Acting DCI…
  • p. 204 …in-the DDP in order to maintain control of his overhead reconnais- sance projects (the U…
  • p. 220 …Strongly favoring Air Force control of the U-2 missions over Cuba. the DOD representatives called…
  • p. 335 …The flood of information that the U-2 missions gathered led to a major expansion of…
  • p. 340 …In 1959 Bissell became Deputy Director for Plans but kept the reconnaissance projects under his control…
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Chapter 6
300
demonstrated its ability to conduct overflights of Cuba by the 5
November deadline, which passed without any hostile action by the
Soviets or Cubans. The detachment then worked to develop the capa-
bility for sustained operations with its five aircraft. All these
preparations were valuable training for the OXCART pro g ram, even
though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect.
Since U-2s continued to satisfy collection requirements for Cuba, the
A-1 2s were reserved for more critical situations.
When the Agency declared that OXCART had achieved emer-
gency operational status on 5 November 1964. the aircraft was still
not prepared for electronic warfare, as only one of the several planned
electronic countermeasure devices had been installed. Nevertheless, a
senior government panel decided that the OXCART could conduct
initial overflights of Cuba without a full complement of warning and
jamming devices, should the need for such missions arise.
One reason for the delay in completing OXCART's electronic
warfare preparations was the Air Force's concern that OXCART use
of existing ECM devices could, in the event of the loss of an
OXCART over hostile territory, compromise the ECM equipment
used by Air Force bombers and fi g hters. Even if OXCART's ECM
devices were merely similar to military ECM systems, the Air Force
still worried that their use would give the Soviets an opportunity to
work out countermeasures.
Such concerns led the Agency to an entirely different approach
to antiradar efforts in Project KEMPSTER. This project attempted to
develop electron guns that could be mounted on the OXCART to gen-
erate an ion cloud in front of the plane that would reduce its radar
cross section. Although this project proved unsuccessful, the CIA also
developed a number of more conventional ECM devices for use in the
OXCART."
As the OXCART's performance and equipment continued to im-
prove. there was renewed consideration of deploying the aircraft
overseas, particularly in Asia, where US military activity was increas-
ing. On 18 March 1965, DC1 McCone. Secretary of Defense
McNamara, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance discussed the
" OSA History. chap. 20, pp. 149-151 (TS Codeword): Notes on the OXCART project by
John Parangtisky. OSA records (TS Codewora
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.