Documents / FOIA release

/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 12 …later, at press conferences in February and July 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson revealed the existence…
  • p. 40 …MIT Press. 1977), p. 68: Beschloss, Maplay, p. 74: TCP Report. pp. 185-186 (S). UNCLASSIFIED
  • p. 98 …The Soviet Union sent strongly worded protest notes to the United States and the nations from…
  • p. 102 …not only press releases and the public line to be taken, but also the suspension of…
  • p. 107 …The "provisional" designation gave the U-2 detachments greater security because provisional Air Force units did…
  • p. 112 …at a press conference that the Soviet Union might be ahead of the United States in…
  • p. 125 …Dial Press, 1982), pp. 45-47. Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword). UNCLASSIFIED
  • p. 174 …McElroy stressed that the gap would be temporary and that at its end the United States…
  • p. 195 …in the press about the presence of "spyplanes" on Japanese territory, asked the United States to…
  • p. 198 …DCI records (S). " United States Congress, Senate. Foreign Relations Committee, Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign…
  • p. 307 …By 1962 the United States had become aware of the effectiveness of a new Soviet radar…
  • p. 315 …To preserve the secrecy of the OXCART program, the Air Force informed the press that an…
  • p. 328 …at times when the press and Congress alleged that the United States was falling behind the…
  • p. 362 …MIT Press, 1977. Kistiakowsky. George B. A Scientist at the White House. Cambridge: Harvard University Press…
-0O5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Se t
Chapter 6
297
decided to gol land take charge of the OXCART's develop-
ment himself. His presence made a big difference, as can be seen in
his notes in the project log:
I uncovered many items of a managerial, materiel and design na-
ture.... I had meetings with vendors to improve their opera-
tion.... Changed supervision and had daily talks with them,
going over in detail all problems on the aircraft.... Increased the
supervision in the electrical group by 500%.... We tightened up
the inspection procedures a great deal and made inspection stick.
It appears that the problems are one-third due to bum engineer-
ing.... The addition of so many systems to the A-I2 has greatly
complicated the problems, but we did solve the overall problenz."
These improvements in on-site management got the project back on
schedule.
By 20 November 1965, the final validation flights for OXCART
deployment were finished. During these tests, the OXCART achieved
a maximum speed of Mach 3.29, an altitude of 90,000 feet, and sus-
tained flight time above Mach 3.2 of 74 minutes. The maximum
- egdurance test lasted six hours and 20 minutes. On 22. November.
Kelly Johnson wrote to Brig. Gen. Jack C. Ledford. head of the
Office of Special Activities, stating, -The time has come when the
bird should leave its nest.'
Three years and seven months after its first flight in April 1962,
the OXCART was ready for operational use. It was now time to find
work for the most advanced aircraft ever conceived and built.
ED 129581.61[11111>1010425Yrs
(Si
"OXCART Story," p. 23 (S).
UNCLASSIFIED

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.