Documents / FOIA release

/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 4 …Scientists and Overhead Reconnaissance 17 The BEACON HILL Report 17 Concern About the Danger of a…
  • p. 14 …view of the "other side of the hill." With the advent of dry film, it became…
  • p. 30 …of this new advisory body." The BEACON HILL Report In 1951 the Air Force sought even…
  • p. 31 …Their head- quarters was located over a secretarial school on Beacon Hill, which soon became the…
  • p. 32 …to implement the ideas of the BEACON HILL Report until the summer of 1953. By this…
  • p. 34 …Created in July 1953, the Intelligence Systems Panel (ISP) included several experts from the BEACON HILL…
  • p. 37 …reconnais- sance needs expressed in the BEACON HILL Report. Theoretically, he explained to the panel, any…
  • p. 41 …H. T. Friis R. Mettler A. G. Hill E. Purcell W. H. Radford E. H. Plesset…
  • p. 44 …6(dli1i>10<25Yrs since the BEACON HILL and Intelligence Systems Panel meetings. (Si James Baker…
  • p. 45 …Having participated in the BEACON HILL Study and the Intelligence Systems Panel, several Project Three members…
  • p. 344 …He headed the Beacon Hill Panel in 1952 and later became director of Lincoln Laboratories. PARANGOSKY…
  • p. 345 …of several advisory panels, including the BEACON HILL project. He helped Baker decide what cameras to…
  • p. 364 …BEACON HILL Report: Problems of Air Force Intelligence and Reconnaissance. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 15 June…
-0O5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Se t
Chapter 6
297
decided to gol land take charge of the OXCART's develop-
ment himself. His presence made a big difference, as can be seen in
his notes in the project log:
I uncovered many items of a managerial, materiel and design na-
ture.... I had meetings with vendors to improve their opera-
tion.... Changed supervision and had daily talks with them,
going over in detail all problems on the aircraft.... Increased the
supervision in the electrical group by 500%.... We tightened up
the inspection procedures a great deal and made inspection stick.
It appears that the problems are one-third due to bum engineer-
ing.... The addition of so many systems to the A-I2 has greatly
complicated the problems, but we did solve the overall problenz."
These improvements in on-site management got the project back on
schedule.
By 20 November 1965, the final validation flights for OXCART
deployment were finished. During these tests, the OXCART achieved
a maximum speed of Mach 3.29, an altitude of 90,000 feet, and sus-
tained flight time above Mach 3.2 of 74 minutes. The maximum
- egdurance test lasted six hours and 20 minutes. On 22. November.
Kelly Johnson wrote to Brig. Gen. Jack C. Ledford. head of the
Office of Special Activities, stating, -The time has come when the
bird should leave its nest.'
Three years and seven months after its first flight in April 1962,
the OXCART was ready for operational use. It was now time to find
work for the most advanced aircraft ever conceived and built.
ED 129581.61[11111>1010425Yrs
(Si
"OXCART Story," p. 23 (S).
UNCLASSIFIED

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.