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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …fly, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems was the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti- tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell's weather research cover re…
  • p. 138 …Then in January 1960, the commander of Detachment B, raised an important question that had never…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threatening as the blockade of 1948-49, President…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig- inal U-2s with the J75 engines." Detachment C…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on I May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo- graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pilots never flew…
  • p. 264 Sratrt.11/Qt2.1....31■1 Chapter 5 251 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED There was never another Agency…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabilizers.'4 THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be- fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the J58 was never used in a Navy aircraft. OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and locktin modes, a fact that…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …Yet, the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
Chapter 6
295
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
these aircraft were hastily flown to Edwards Air Force Base. From
this point on, the Air Force versions of the OXCART were based at
Edwards and provided a diversion so that the faster and higher flying
A-12s1 could continue testing out of the public eye.
The President's announcement did not mention the CIA's in-
volvement in the project, which remained classified, but keeping the
Agency's extensive role in the OXCART a secret was not an easy task.
The first step had been to separate the Air Force's versions of the A-I2
from the Agency's by moving the Air Force aircraft to California.
Next, those firms that were to be given the new technology had to be
briefed on the program and agree to abide by the same secrecy agree-
ments then in force with Lockheed. Moreover, everyone witting of
OXCART (including those no longer associated with the program,
such as Allen Dulles, Richard Bissell, and General Cabell) had been
briefed about the impending Presidential announcement, so that they
would not think that the need for secrecy about OXCART had ended.'
The process of surfacing versions of the OXCART continued on
.25_July 1964, when President Johnson revealed the existence of a new
Air Force reconnaissance aircraft, which he called the SR-7 I.
Actually, the President was supposed to say RS-71 (for "reconnais-
sance-strike"). Deciding that renaming the aircraft was easier than
correcting President Johnson, the Air Force invented a new category—
"strategic reconnaissance"—to explain the SR-7('s designation.
ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS DURING FINAL TESTING
The first A-12 crash occurred on 24 May 1963, when a detachment
pilot, realizing the airspeed indication was confusing and erroneous,
decided to eject. The pilot was unhurt, but the plane was destroyed
when it crashed near Wendover, Utah. A cover story for the press de-
scribed the plane as an F-105. All A-12s were grounded for a week
while the accident was investigated. The malfunction was found to be
caused by ice that had plugged up a pitot-static tube used to determine
airspeed.'"
"OSA History. chap. 20. P. 76 (TS Codeword).
" Ibid.. pp. 69-70 (TS Codcword).
(0129581.1ildlill>10<25Yrs
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UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.