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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 12 …later, at press conferences in February and July 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson revealed the existence…
  • p. 40 …MIT Press. 1977), p. 68: Beschloss, Maplay, p. 74: TCP Report. pp. 185-186 (S). UNCLASSIFIED
  • p. 98 …The Soviet Union sent strongly worded protest notes to the United States and the nations from…
  • p. 102 …not only press releases and the public line to be taken, but also the suspension of…
  • p. 107 …The "provisional" designation gave the U-2 detachments greater security because provisional Air Force units did…
  • p. 112 …at a press conference that the Soviet Union might be ahead of the United States in…
  • p. 125 …Dial Press, 1982), pp. 45-47. Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword). UNCLASSIFIED
  • p. 174 …McElroy stressed that the gap would be temporary and that at its end the United States…
  • p. 195 …in the press about the presence of "spyplanes" on Japanese territory, asked the United States to…
  • p. 198 …DCI records (S). " United States Congress, Senate. Foreign Relations Committee, Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign…
  • p. 307 …By 1962 the United States had become aware of the effectiveness of a new Soviet radar…
  • p. 315 …To preserve the secrecy of the OXCART program, the Air Force informed the press that an…
  • p. 328 …at times when the press and Congress alleged that the United States was falling behind the…
  • p. 362 …MIT Press, 1977. Kistiakowsky. George B. A Scientist at the White House. Cambridge: Harvard University Press…
-0O5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
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John Parangosky
OFORN
Chapter 6
289
fillets, which had been secured to the airframe with epoxy resin, had
to be recovered and reaffixed to the aircraft, a process that took the
next four days.
Once the fillets were in place, the OXCART's official first flight
took place on 30 April 1962, witnessed by a number of Agency per-
sonnel including DDR Scoville. Richard Bissell was also present, and
Kelly Johnson noted in the project log, "I was very happy to have
Dick see this flight, with all that he has contributed to the pro-
gram." " This official first flight was also the first flight with the
wheels up. Piloted again by Schalk, the OXCART took off at 170
knots and climbed to 30,000 feet. During the 59-minute flight, the
A-12 achieved a top speed of 340 knots. Kelly Johnson declared it to
be the smoothest first test flight of any aircraft he had designed or
tested. On 2 May 1962, during the second test flight, the OXCART
broke the sound barrier, achieving a speed of Mach 1.1.'"
Four more aircraft, including a two-seat trainer, arrived at the
testing site before the end of the year. During the second delivery on
26.1une 1962, the extra-wide vehicle carrying the aircraft accidentally
struck a Greyhound bus traveling in the opposite direct-ion. Project
managers quickly authorized payment of $4,890 for the damage done
to the bus in order to avoid having to explain in court why the
OXCART delivery vehicle was so wide.
One of the biggest problems connected with flight testing the
A-12 was keeping its existence secret. Realizing that the nation's air
traffic controllers would be among the first unwitting people to learn
about the plane, the Deputy Assistant Director for Special Activities,
1 ihad called on Federal Aviation Administrator
Najeeb E. Halaby in early 1962 to brief him about the craft's existence
and ask his assistance in keeping it secret. Halaby cooperated fully
with the Agency and personally briefed all FAA regional chiefs on how
to handle reports of unusually fast, high-flying aircraft. Air controllers
were warned not to mention the craft on the radio but to submit written
reports of sightings or radar trackings. The Air Force gave similar
briefings to NORAD, the North American Air Defense Command."
ED 129581.61dli1l>1010<25Yrs
(Si
I •I'OXCART Story, - pp. 10-11 (5); OSA History, chap. 20, P. 60 ITS Codeword)
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.