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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …fly, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems was the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti- tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell's weather research cover re…
  • p. 138 …Then in January 1960, the commander of Detachment B, raised an important question that had never…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threatening as the blockade of 1948-49, President…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig- inal U-2s with the J75 engines." Detachment C…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on I May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo- graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pilots never flew…
  • p. 264 Sratrt.11/Qt2.1....31■1 Chapter 5 251 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED There was never another Agency…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabilizers.'4 THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be- fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the J58 was never used in a Navy aircraft. OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and locktin modes, a fact that…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …Yet, the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
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Chapter 6
286
ED 129581.6M11>101045Yrs
1S1
DELIVERY OF THE FIRST OXCART
The first A- 12, known as article 121, was assembled and tested at
Burbank during January and February 1962. Since it could not be
flown to the site, the aircraft had to be partially disassembled
and put on a specially designed trailer that cost nearly S100,000. The
entire fuselage, without the wings, was crated and covered, creating a
load 35 feet wide and 105 feet long. To transport this huge load safely
over the hundreds of miles to the site, obstructing road signs were re-
moved, trees were trimmed, and some roadbanks had to be leveled.
The plane left Burbank on 26 February 1962 and arrived at
two days later.
After the fuselage arrived in Nevada. its wings were attached and
the J75 engines were installed, but the aircraft was still not ready to be
tested. This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem
that would never be solved completely. Because the A-12's high
speeds heat the titanium airframe to more than 500°F. Lockheed
designers had to make allowances for expansion. When the metal was
cold, the expansion joints were at their widest. In the fuel tanks, these
zaps were tilled by pliable sealants. but the fuel for the A-12's engines
acted as a strong reducin g agent that softened the sealants. causing
leaks. Thus, when fuel was first poured into the aircraft, 68 leaks
developed. Lockheed technicians then stripped and replaced all the
sealant, a tedious and time consuming procedure because the sealant
required four curing cycles, each at a different temperature over a
period of 30 to 54 hours. The engineers were never able to discover a
sealant compound that was completely impervious to the jet fuel while
remainin g elastic enough to expand and contract sufficiently. The
A-12's tanks continued to leak, so when it was fueled, it only received
enough fuel to get airborne. The plane would then rendezvous with a
tanker, top off its tanks. and immediately climb to operating altitude,
causing the metal to expand and the leaks to stop.'"
CHANGES IN THE PROJECT MANAGEMENT
Richard Bissell, whose concern for the viability of the U-2 in 1956
had led to the establishment of Project OXCART and who had di-
rected its growth all along, was no longer in charge when the first
OSA History, chap. 20. p. 62 ITS Codewort0;" "OXCART Story." p I I (S)
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.