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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 9 …The struggle between the CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and…
  • p. 72 …2 missions. Access to the photographs taken by the U-2 would be strictly controlled, which…
  • p. 73 …This pact gave the Air Force responsibility for pilot selection and training, weather information, mission plotting…
  • p. 81 …Before the start of a mission, the ground crew set the counters to indicate the total…
  • p. 96 …All of the products from this project would be placed in the new control sys- tem…
  • p. 100 …This was an S-band radar used by Soviet forces for early warning and ground-controlled…
  • p. 113 …The President nevertheless maintained tight control over the program and authorized only 10 days of overflights…
  • p. 128 …the following day, whithi next U-2 mission returned from the Middle East. After quickly developing…
  • p. 140 …Welzenbach (S); Mission folder 4020 (18 Marcn n, CJJA rerar9 ITS Codeword). OSA History. chap. 4…
  • p. 142 …of the first series of U-2 missions as condu this research under a project codenamed…
  • p. 147 …not an easy task in crowded Japan.`) Detachment C began conducting missions in June 1957 after…
  • p. 191 …This revised cover story, along with a mission flight plan consistent with it, was sent to…
  • p. 196 …with Abel's "wife" (probably his Soviet control) in East Germany. In November 1961, Acting DCI…
  • p. 204 …in-the DDP in order to maintain control of his overhead reconnais- sance projects (the U…
  • p. 220 …Strongly favoring Air Force control of the U-2 missions over Cuba. the DOD representatives called…
  • p. 335 …The flood of information that the U-2 missions gathered led to a major expansion of…
  • p. 340 …In 1959 Bissell became Deputy Director for Plans but kept the reconnaissance projects under his control…
'OXCART Story.-
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
SecrefT
Chapter 6
284
EO 129581.61d1[11>1010<25Yrs
(Si
storage capacity, and runway length were insufficient for the
OXCART program, the site's remote location would greatly ease the
task of maintaining the program's security, and a moderate construc-
tion program could provide adequate facilities. Construction began in
September 1960; a C-47 shuttle service ferried work crews from
Burbank to Las Vegas and from Las Vegas to the site.
The new 8,500-foot runway was completed by 15 November
1960. Kelly Johnson had been reluctant to have a standard Air Force
runway with expansion joints every 25 feet because he feared the
joints would set up undesirable vibrations in the speedy aircraft. At
his suggestion a 150-foot wide runway was therefore constructed of
six 25-foot-wide longitudinal sections, each 150 feet long but stag-
gered. This layout put most of the expansion joints parallel to the di-
rection of aircraft roll and reduced the frequency of the joints.
Additional improvements included the resurfacing of 18 miles of
hi g hway leading to the base so that heavy fuel trucks could bring in
the necessary fuel. The need for additional buildings on the base was
met by the Navy. Three surplus Navy hangars were dismantled,
moved, and reassembled on the north side of the base, and more than
100 surplus Navy housing buildings were also transported to
All essential facilities were ready in time for the forecast delivery
date of the first A-12 on 1 August 1961.'
Unfortunately, this delivery date began to slip further and further
into the future. Delays in obtaining the titanium, and later the 158 en-
gines, caused the postponement of the final assembly of the first plane.
Eventually, Kelly Johnson and Agency project officials decided to be-
gin testing without waiting for the 158 engines by using Pratt &
Whitney J75/ I9W engines, designed for the Convair F-106, to test the
A-12 at altitudes up to 50,000 feet and at speeds up to Mach 1.6. Such
a change, however, meant that the en g ine compartment of the first air-
craft had to be reconfigured to accommodate the J75 en g ine. Lockheed
hoped that this substitution would permit the delivery of the first A-12
by 22 December 1961 and its initial test flight by 27 February 1962.
Lockheed ran into so many technological problems with the
OXCART effort that by October 1961 its costs had swollen to $136
million and were still climbing. Something obviously had to be done
OSA Histbry. chap. 20. pp. 39-40, 43, 51 (TS Codcword)
pp. 7-9 (S).
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.