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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …fly, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems was the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti- tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell's weather research cover re…
  • p. 138 …Then in January 1960, the commander of Detachment B, raised an important question that had never…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threatening as the blockade of 1948-49, President…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig- inal U-2s with the J75 engines." Detachment C…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on I May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo- graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pilots never flew…
  • p. 264 Sratrt.11/Qt2.1....31■1 Chapter 5 251 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED There was never another Agency…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabilizers.'4 THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be- fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the J58 was never used in a Navy aircraft. OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and locktin modes, a fact that…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …Yet, the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Secr ORN
Chapter 6
278
to achieve the desired targ et altitude of 91,000 feet. Afterward, he
noted in the project log: "We have no performance margins left; so
this project. instead of being 10 times as hard as anythin g we have
done, is 12 times as hard. This matches the design number and is ob-
viously right.-
These changes satisfied Bissell, who notified Johnson on 26
January that the CIA was authorizing the construction of 12 of the •
new aircraft. The actual contract was signed on II February 1960.
Lockheed's original quotation for the project was $96.6 million for 12
aircraft, but technolo g ical difficulties eventually made this price im-
possible to meet. Recognizing that fabricating an aircraft from tita-
nium might involve unforeseen difficulties, the CIA included a clause
in the contract that allowed costs to be reevaluated. During the next
five years, this clause had to be invoked on a number of occasions as
the A-I2's costs soared to more than double the original estimate.'
NEW TECHNOLOGIES NECESSITATED
BY OXCART'S HIGH SPEED
According to the specifications. the OXCART aircraft was to achieve
a speed of Mach 3.2 (2.064 knots or 0.57 miles per second, which
would make it as fast as a rifle bullet), have a range of 4,120 nautical
miles, and reach altitudes of 84.500 to 97.600 feet. The new aircraft
would thus be more than five times as fast as the U-2 and would go
almost 3 miles higher.
One major disadvantage of the OXCART's great speed was high
temperatures. Flying through the earth's atmosphere at Mach 3.2
heated portions of the aircraft's skin to almost 900°F. An aircraft op-
erating at these high speeds and high temperatures required fuels. lu-
bricants, and hydraulic fluids that had not yet been invented. The
OXCART's fuel requirement called for a low-vapor-pressure fuel
with a low volume at operating temperatures: the fuel would also be
used as a heat sink to cool various parts of the aircraft. The 158 en-
g ines required lubricants that did not break down at the very high op-
erating temperatures of Mach 3.2 speeds. This requirement led to the
"Johnson, "Archangel 21 January 1960.
OSA History. chap. N. pp. 27-29. 33-34. 36 ITS Codewurd).
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.