Documents / FOIA release
This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.
“Burbank”8 pages
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED Chapter 1 16 States might use against the Soviet Bloc in the event of another up- rising such as the East Berlin riots of June 1953. Bissell quickly concluded that there was not much hope for clandestine operations against Bloc nations. As he remarked later: "I know I emerged from that exercise feeling that very little could be done." This belief would later make Bissell a leading advocate of technical rather than human means of intelligence collection.'s Bissell joined the Agency in late January 1954 and soon became involved in coordination for the operation aimed at overthrowing Guatemalan President Jacob° Arbenz. He was, therefore very preoc- cupied when Philip Strong approached him in mid-May 1954 with the concept of the proposed spyplane from Lockheed. Bissell said that the idea had merit and told Strong to get some topflight scientists to ad- vise on the matter. Afterward he returned to the final planning for the Guatemalan operation and promptly forgot about the CL-282.76 Meanwhile, Strong went about drumming up support for high-al- titude overflight. In May 1954 he persuaded DCI Allen W. Dulles to Richard M. Bissell, Jr. ask the Air Force to take the initiative in gaining approval for an overflight of the Soviet guided-missile test range at Kapustin Yar. Dulles's memorandum did not mention the CL-282 or any of the other proposed high-altitude aircraft. CIA and Air Force officials met on several occasions to explore the overflight proposal, which the Air Force finally turned down in October 1954.27 EO 129581.6(d1111>1010<25Yrs (SI Although Allen Dulles was willing to support an Air Force over- flight of the Soviet Union, he was not enthusiastic about the CIA un- dertaking such a project. Few details about Dulles's precise attitude toward the proposed Lockheed reconnaissance aircraft are available, but many who knew him believe that he did not want the CIA to be- come involved in projects that belonged to the military, and the Lockheed CL-282 had been designed for an Air Force requirement. Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1979). p. 79; Beschloss. Mayday, pp. 86-89. Memorandum for H. Marshall Chadwell, Assistant Director/Scientific Intelligence. from Chief. Support Staff, OSI, "Review of OSA Activities Concerned with Scientific and Technical Collection Techniques," 13 May 1955, p. 6, OSI (OSWR) records. S); Richard M. Bissell. Jr., interview by Donald E. Welzenbach, ton, Connecticut, 8 November 1984 (S).recoraing nu-until "7 Memorandum for Richard M. Bissell, Special Assistant to the Director for Planning and Coordination, from Philip G. Strong, Chief. Operations Staff, OSI, "Overflight of Kapustin Yar." 15 October 1954, OSI (OSWR) records TS, down- graded to S). UNCLASSIFIED
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.