Documents / FOIA release
/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf
Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer
This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.
“Nevers”24 pages
- p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have
become known. The assistance…
- p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been
a formal decision as such. In…
- p. 74 …fly, Lockheed engineers had to solve
problems never before encountered. Among these problems was the
need…
- p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti-
tudes never before attained in sustained…
- p. 102 …put aside for further thought
(which it never received), and Bissell's weather research cover re…
- p. 138 …Then in January 1960, the commander of Detachment B,
raised an important question that had never…
- p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never
entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
- p. 159 …Six of the men on board were
killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
- p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threatening
as the blockade of 1948-49, President…
- p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig-
inal U-2s with the J75 engines."
Detachment C…
- p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into
the mission, an SA…
- p. 208 …very
good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because
satellite photography gradually began…
- p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on I
May 1960 proved to be the…
- p. 223 …Responsibility for photo-
graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pilots
never flew…
- p. 264 Sratrt.11/Qt2.1....31■1
Chapter 5
251
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
There was never another Agency…
- p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated
vertical stabilizers.'4
THE OXCART…
- p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be-
fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
- p. 298 …As it turned out, the J58 was
never used in a Navy aircraft.
OSA History. chap…
- p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem
that would never be solved…
- p. 313 …even
though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect.
Since U-2s continued to…
- p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and
locktin modes, a fact that…
- p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the
OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
- p. 328 …Yet, the President never went so far
as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in…
- p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of
this aircraft also led to…
--Irrefet-44
Chapter 6
269
Lockheed A-11
UNCLASSIFIED
to be ignited. Since ramjet engines had only been tested in wind tun-
nels, there was no available data to prove that these engines would
work in the application proposed by Convair. The second uncertain
factor was the B-58B bomber that was supposed to achieve Mach 2.2
before launching the FISH above 35,000 feet. This version of the
B-58 was still in the design stage.
Convair's proposal suffered a major setback in June 1959, when
the Air Force canceled the B-58B project. Conversion of the older,
slower B-58A into a supersonic launching platform for the FISH was
ruled out by the high cost and technical difficulties involved.
Moreover, the Air Force was unwilling to part with two aircraft from
the small inventory of its most advanced bomber. Even had the B-58B
program not been canceled, however, the FISH proposal would proba-
bly not have been feasible. Convair engineers had calculated that the
added weight of the FISH would prevent the B-58B from achieving
the speed required to ignite the parasite aircraft's ramjet engines.
The Convair proposal was therefore unusable, but the Lockheed
design with its high radar cross section was also unacceptable to the
Land committee. On 14 July 1959, the committee rejected both
UNCLASSIFIED
Not linked to a story yet.
About this file
FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.