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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …fly, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems was the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti- tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell's weather research cover re…
  • p. 138 …Then in January 1960, the commander of Detachment B, raised an important question that had never…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threatening as the blockade of 1948-49, President…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig- inal U-2s with the J75 engines." Detachment C…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on I May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo- graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pilots never flew…
  • p. 264 Sratrt.11/Qt2.1....31■1 Chapter 5 251 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED There was never another Agency…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabilizers.'4 THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be- fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the J58 was never used in a Navy aircraft. OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and locktin modes, a fact that…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …Yet, the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
-0O5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
"Stveret-NORMAL—_
Chapter 6
268
Rodgers determined that a high-altitude object moving two to
three times as fast as a normal aircraft would produce such a small
blip with so little persistence that the radar operator would have great
difficulty tracking it, if indeed he could even see it. Rodgers esti-
mated that for an aircraft to take advantage of this Blip/Scan Ratio
phenomenon it must fly at altitudes approaching 90,000 feet and have
a radar cross section of less than 10 square meters, preferably not
much over 5 square meters. However, for a Mach 3.0 aircraft to
achieve such a small radar cross section, its designers would have to
make many concessions in its structural design and aerodynamics.'
By the summer of 1959, both firms had completed their propos-
als. In early June, Lockheed submitted a design for a ground-launched
aircraft known as the A-11. It would have a speed of Mach 3.2, a
range of 3,200 miles, an altitude of 90,000 feet, and a completion date
of January 1961.Kelly Johnson had refused to reduce the aerodynam-
ics of his design in order to achieve a greater antiradar capability, and
the A-1 l's radar cross section, although not great, was substantially
larger than that of the much smaller parasite aircraft being designed
by Convair.9
The Convair proposal called for a small, manned, ramjet-pow-
ered, reconnaissance vehicle to be air launched from one of two spe-
cially configured Convair B-5813 Super Hustlers. The FISH vehicle, a
radical lifting body with a very-small-radar cross section, would fly at
Mach 4.2 at 90.000 feet and have a range of 3.900 miles. Two
Marquardt ramjets would power its Mach 4.2 dash over the target
area. Once the FISH decelerated, two Pratt & Whitney JT-12 turbojets
would bring it back to base. The ramjet exit nozzles and wing edges
would be constructed of Pyroceram, a ceramic material that could
withstand the high temperatures of very high speeds and would ab-
sorb radiofrequency energy from radar pulses. Convair stated that the
FISH could be ready by January 1961.0
Convair's proposal depended on two uncertain factors. First and
foremost was the unproven technology of ramjet engines. At the time,
no aircraft in existence could carry a large, ramjet-powered craft into
the sky and then accelerate to sufficient speed for the ramjet engines
'Unnumbered Conva r document on the Blip/Scan Ratio or Rodgers Effect (TS).
'Johnson. "Archangel log. - December 1958-July 1959.
OSA History. chap. 20. p. 12 (TS Codeword): Convair Division. General Dynamics
Corporation. "Project FISH Status Review." 9 June 1959 (S).
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.