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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …fly, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems was the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti- tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell's weather research cover re…
  • p. 138 …Then in January 1960, the commander of Detachment B, raised an important question that had never…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threatening as the blockade of 1948-49, President…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig- inal U-2s with the J75 engines." Detachment C…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on I May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo- graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pilots never flew…
  • p. 264 Sratrt.11/Qt2.1....31■1 Chapter 5 251 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED There was never another Agency…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabilizers.'4 THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be- fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the J58 was never used in a Navy aircraft. OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and locktin modes, a fact that…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …Yet, the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
oRN
Chapter 1
15
Philip Strong
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
mainly with XF-104 jigs and designs. . . . The prototype of thi)
plane can be produced within a year from the date of order. Five
planes could be delivered for operations within two years.
The Bell proposal is a more conventional aircraft having nor-
mal landing gear As a result, its maximum altitude over target
is 69,500 feet and the speed and range are not as good as the
Lockheed CL-282.
Gardner's enthusiasm for the CL-282 had given Strong the false
impression that most Air Force officials supported the Lockheed de-
sign. In reality, the Air Force's uniformed hierarchy was in the pro-
cess of choosing the modified version of the Martin B-57 and the new
Bell X-16 to meet future reconnaissance needs.
During their meeting with Strong, Trevor Gardner, Frederick
Ayer, and Garrison Norton explained that they favored the CL-282
because it gave promise of flyin g, higher than the other designs and
because at maximum altitude its smaller radar cross section might
make it invisible to existing Soviet radars. The three officials asked
Strong if the CIA would be interested in such an aircraft. Strong
promised to talk to the Director of Central Intelligence's newly hired
Special Assistant for Planning and Coordination, Richard M. Bissell,
Jr., about possible Agency interest in the CL-282.4
Richard Bissell had already had an active and varied career be-
fore he joined the CIA. A graduate of Groton and Yale, Bissell stud-
ied at the London School of Economics for a year and then
completed a doctorate at Yale in 1939. He taught economics, first at
Yale and then from 1942 at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT), where he became a full professor in 1948. During
World War II, Bissell had managed American shipping as executive
officer of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board. After the war,
he served as deputy director of the Marshall Plan from 1948 until the
end of 1951, when he became a staff member of the Ford
Foundation. His first association with the Agency came in late 1953,
when he undertook a contract study of possible responses the United E0129581.6(dlill>10<25Yrs
IS)
Philip G. Strong. Memorandum for the Record. "Special Aircraft for Penetration Photo
Reconnaissance," 12 May 1954, OSI records (now in OSWR) S).
Karl H. Weber, The Office of Scientific Intelligence. 1949-68, Directorate of Science
and Technology Historical Series OS1-1 (CIA: DS&T. 1972), vol. I. tab A. pp. 16-17 (TS
Codeword).
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.