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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 260 …Afterward, the mon- soon season prevented any further missions until 21 July 1973. This -Mission obtained…
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Sec
Chapter 6
262
The two most prominent firms involved in the search for a new
aircraft were Lockheed, which had designed the successful U-2, and
Convair, which was building the supersonic B-58 "Hustler" bomber
for the Air Force and also working on an even faster model known as
the B-58B "Super Hustler." Early in 1958, Richard Bissell asked of-
ficials from both firms to submit designs for a high-speed reconnais-
sance aircraft. During the spring and summer of 1958, both firms
worked on design concepts without government contracts or funds.
Following extended discussions with Bissell on the subject of a
supersonic successor to the U-2, Lockheed's Kelly Johnson began de-
signing an aircraft that would cruise at Mach 3.0 at altitudes above
90,000 feet. On 23 July 1958, Johnson presented his new high-speed
concept to Land's advisory committee, which expressed interest in the
approach he was taking. At the same meeting, Navy representatives
presented a concept for a high-altitude reconnaissance vehicle that ex-
amined the possibility of developing a ramjet-powered, inflatable,
rubber vehicle that would be lifted to altitude by a balloon and then
be propelled by a rocket to a speed where the ramjets could produce
thrust. Richard Bissell asked Johnson to evaluate this concept, and
three weeks later, after receiving more details from Navy repre-
sentatives, Kelly Johnson made some quick calculations that showed
that the design was impractical because the balloon would have to be
a mile in diameter to lift the vehicle, which in turn would need a wing
surface area greater than one-seventh of an acre to carry the payload.'
By September 1958, Lockheed had studied a number of possible
configurations, some based on ramjet engines, others with both rain-
jets and turbojets. Personnel at Lockheed's Skunk Works referred to
these aircraft concepts as "Archangel-1," "Archangel-2," and so
forth, a carryover from the original nickname of "Angel" given to the
U-2 during its development. These nicknames for the various designs
soon became simply "A-1," "A-2," etc.
In September 1958, the Land committee met again to review all
the concepts then under consideration and to winnow out the few that
were most practicable. Among the concepts rejected were the Navy's
proposal for art inflatable, ramjet-powered aircraft, a Boeing proposal
for a 190-foot-long hydrogen-powered inflatable aircraft, and a
'Clarence L. Johnson, "Development of the Lockheed SR-7l Blackbird," Studies in
Intelligence 26 (Summer I982):4 (U); Johnson. "Archangel log," 23 July 1958, 14
August 1958.
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.