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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 11 …At great risk, US Air Force and Navy aircraft had been conducting peripheral reconnaissance and shallow…
  • p. 16 …As a result, in the late 1940s, the US Air Force and Navy began trying to…
  • p. 17 …Two months later, on 7 October 1952, Soviet fighter aircraft stalked and shot down a US…
  • p. 72 …agreement with the Air Force and the Navy (which at that time was also interested in…
  • p. 147 …turned to the Navy, which granted permission for Detachment C to use the Naval Air Station…
  • p. 180 …The Army, Navy, and CIA, however, doubted that any had been deployed, because none could be…
  • p. 223 …by Air Force and Navy reconnais- sance aircraft. President Kennedy used NPIC photographs to illustrate his…
  • p. 273 …Charyk, and his Navy counterpart, Garrison Norton. Designers from several air- craft manufacturers also attended some…
  • p. 283 …This engine had originally been developed for the Navy's large, jet-powered flying boat, the…
  • p. 297 …The need for additional buildings on the base was met by the Navy. Three surplus Navy…
  • p. 298 …After hearing Bissell and Holcomb's suggestion that the J58 might be used in future Navy…
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
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Chapter 6
259
The U-2's Intended Successor:
Project OXCART,
1956-1968
Before the U-2 became operational in June 1956, CIA project offi-
cials had estimated that its life expectancy for flying safely over the
Soviet Union would be between 18 months and two years. After
overflights began and the Soviets demonstrated the capability of
tracking and attempting to intercept the U-2, this estimate seemed
too optimistic. By August 1956, Richard Bissell was so concerned
.a6Out the U-2's vulnerability that he despaired of its ability to avoid
destruction for six months, let alone two years.
To extend the U-2's useful operational life, project officials first
attempted to reduce the aircraft's vulnerability to detection by Soviet
radars. Project RAINBOW's efforts to mask the radar image of the
U-2 not only proved ineffective, but actually made the aircraft more
vulnerable by adding extra weight that reduced its maximum altitude.
Because Soviet radar operators continued to find and track U-2s
equipped with antiradar systems, the CIA canceled Project
RAINBOW in May 1958.
Long before the failure of Project RAINBOW, Richard Bissell
and his Air Force assistant, Col. Jack A. Gibbs, had begun to look for
a more radical solution to the problem of Soviet radar detection—an
entirely new aircraft. In the late summer of 1956, the two officials
visited a number of airframe contractors in a search for new ideas.
Among the more unusual was Northrop Aviation's proposal for a gi-
gantic aircraft with a very-high-lift wing. Because it would not be
made of metal, the wing would require a type of bridge truss on its
upper side to give it rigidity. The proposed aircraft would achieve
Sbet
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.