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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 6 …Project OXCART, 1956-1968 The Evaluation of Designs for a Successor to the U-2 260…
  • p. 22 …retired from the Air Force to become the assistant director of Lockheed's Advanced Development Program…
  • p. 24 ORN Chapter 1 11 Kelly Johnson %.419r.,‹ 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED gravity (g's) instead of the military…
  • p. 27 …He later advanced to the rank of brigadier general in the reserve. For Strong's contacts…
  • p. 32 …lithium deuteride, a tech- nology more advanced than the heavy water method used by US BEACON…
  • p. 33 …between the developed and undeveloped nations. This aggressive Soviet foreign policy, combined with advances in nuclear…
  • p. 58 …secrecy in the new project, Kelly Johnson placed it in Lockheed's Advanced Development facility at…
  • p. 65 …His software algorithms made it possible to model lens designs and determine in advance the effects…
  • p. 76 …UNCLASSIFIED """"Igeret-ALQ Chapter 2 63 advanced gear for the U-2 pilots. David Clark expert…
  • p. 111 …of Soviet advances in long-range bombers and missiles. The initial sighting of the new Soviet…
  • p. 114 …Adenauer be informed in advance of US plans to overfly the Soviet Union from bases in…
  • p. 174 …concentrating on developing the more advanced solid-fueled missiles rather than increasing the num- ber of…
  • p. 191 …the cover story that had been prepared and distributed in advance of the mission. The first…
  • p. 250 …so urgent that the Defense Department finally re ente CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED Advanced ECM Equipment for Demand…
  • p. 265 …the U-2R needed a camera that incorporated the many im- portant advances that had occurred…
  • p. 266 …This camera was actually a very advanced version of the original B camera with a new…
  • p. 282 …aircraft from the small inventory of its most advanced bomber. Even had the B-58B program…
  • p. 295 …In fact, it was an advanced version of the highly reliable B camera developed for the…
  • p. 307 …he an- nounced the successful development of an -advanced experimental jet aircraft, the A-11. which…
  • p. 310 …It was now time to find work for the most advanced aircraft ever conceived and built…
  • p. 321 …advanced aircraft ever built was to be put out to pasture. The aban- donment of the…
  • p. 325 …when the OXCART program ended in the summer of 1968, no more advanced successor was wait…
  • p. 326 …The most advanced aircraft of the 20th century had become an anachronism before it was ever…
  • p. 333 …ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY One very important byproduct of the CIA's manned reconnaissance program was the…
  • p. 334 …the end of the usefulness of the world's most advanced aircraft; its offspring, the SR…
  • p. 335 …Thus, the CIA sponsored the development of the world's most advanced aircraft—the OXCART—and…
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Chapter 6
259
The U-2's Intended Successor:
Project OXCART,
1956-1968
Before the U-2 became operational in June 1956, CIA project offi-
cials had estimated that its life expectancy for flying safely over the
Soviet Union would be between 18 months and two years. After
overflights began and the Soviets demonstrated the capability of
tracking and attempting to intercept the U-2, this estimate seemed
too optimistic. By August 1956, Richard Bissell was so concerned
.a6Out the U-2's vulnerability that he despaired of its ability to avoid
destruction for six months, let alone two years.
To extend the U-2's useful operational life, project officials first
attempted to reduce the aircraft's vulnerability to detection by Soviet
radars. Project RAINBOW's efforts to mask the radar image of the
U-2 not only proved ineffective, but actually made the aircraft more
vulnerable by adding extra weight that reduced its maximum altitude.
Because Soviet radar operators continued to find and track U-2s
equipped with antiradar systems, the CIA canceled Project
RAINBOW in May 1958.
Long before the failure of Project RAINBOW, Richard Bissell
and his Air Force assistant, Col. Jack A. Gibbs, had begun to look for
a more radical solution to the problem of Soviet radar detection—an
entirely new aircraft. In the late summer of 1956, the two officials
visited a number of airframe contractors in a search for new ideas.
Among the more unusual was Northrop Aviation's proposal for a gi-
gantic aircraft with a very-high-lift wing. Because it would not be
made of metal, the wing would require a type of bridge truss on its
upper side to give it rigidity. The proposed aircraft would achieve
Sbet
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.