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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …fly, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems was the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti- tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell's weather research cover re…
  • p. 138 …Then in January 1960, the commander of Detachment B, raised an important question that had never…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threatening as the blockade of 1948-49, President…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig- inal U-2s with the J75 engines." Detachment C…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on I May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo- graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pilots never flew…
  • p. 264 Sratrt.11/Qt2.1....31■1 Chapter 5 251 005653421 UNCLASSIFIED There was never another Agency…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabilizers.'4 THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be- fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the J58 was never used in a Navy aircraft. OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and locktin modes, a fact that…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …Yet, the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
Chapter 1
14
Trevor Gardner
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
design showed the most promise for reconnaissance of the Soviet
Union. This belief was shared by Gardner's special assistant,
Frederick Ayer, Jr., and Garrison Norton, an adviser to Secretary
Talbott.''
According to Norton, Gardner tried to interest SAC commander
LeMay in the Lockheed aircraft because Gardner envisioned it pri-
marily as a collector of strategic, rather than tactical, intelligence. But
General LeMay had already shown that he was not interested in an
unarmed aircraft. Gardner, Ayer, and Norton then decided to seek CIA
support for the high-flying aircraft. At that time the Agency's official
involvement in overhead reconnaissance was limited to advising the
Air Force on the problems of launching lar ge camera-carrying bal-
loons for reconnaissance flights over hostile territory (for the details
of this program, see chapter 2). The Chief of the Operations Staff in
the Office of Scientific Intelli gence, Philip G. Stron g . however,
served on several Air Force advisory boards and kept himself well in-
formed on developments in reconnaissance aircraft.'"
Gardner, Norton, and Ayer met with Strong in the Pentagon on
12 May 1954. six days before the Wright Air Development Command
began to evaluate the Lockheed proposal. Gardner described Kelly
Johnson's proposal and showed the drawings to Strong. After this
meeting. Strong summarized his impressions of the Air Force's search
for a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft:
Proposals for special reconnaissance aircraft have been re-
ceived in the Air Staff from Lockheed, Fairchild, and Bell. . . .
The Lockheed proposal is considered to be the best. It has been
given the type designation of CL-282 and in many respects is a
jet-powered glider based essentially on the Lockheed Day
Fighter XF-I04. It is primarily subsonic but can attain transonic
speeds over the target with a consequent loss of range. With an
altitude of 73,000 feet over the target it has a combat radius of
1,400 nautical miles. . . . The CL-282 can be manufactured
Garrison Norton. interview by Donald E. Welzenbach. tape recording. Washington. DC.
23 May 1983 (S): Michael R. Beschloss. Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2
Affair (New York: Harper & Row. 1986). p. 79.
Strong was a colonel in the Marine Corps Reserve and often used that title even though
he was not on active duty. He later advanced to the rank of brigadier general in the reserve.
For Strong's contacts with senior Air Force officials concerning the CL-282, see the
Norton interview (S).
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.