Documents / FOIA release

/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 91 …Early in the program Bissell and Ritland had foreseen such an emergency and, with the cooperation…
  • p. 95 …of their mission kept the level of cooperation high. The group always attempted to reach a…
  • p. 143 …deception project since its early days, he cooperated reluctantly because he disliked adding attachments that made…
  • p. 196 …as possible while giving the appearance of cooperating with his cap- tors. To extract the maximum…
  • p. 287 …by Edgerton, Germeshausen & Grier (EG&G) in cooperation with the Scientific Engineering Institute at a small…
  • p. 302 …Halaby cooperated fully with the Agency and personally briefed all FAA regional chiefs on how to…
  • p. 334 …The cooperation between the Agency and the Air Force that began with the U-2 and…
CO 5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
(0 12958 1.6IMI1l>101010101010101010<25Yrs
IS1
One reason why
the steady increase in
evidenced by its success in
along
activirY
overflights were stopped was
ability to track and engage U-2s, as
owning five U-2s. By 1968
were keeping a close watch on
and actively tracked U-2s as soon as
they became airborne. me u-hs then had to face a growing PRC air
defense system that not only consisted of SA-2 missiles but also the
r"----1fast and high-flying MiG-21. MiG-21 pilots had become
adept at the power-zoom technique and w re threatening almost every
U-2 mission. The risks to U-2s now seemed too great.°
The decision to end Asian overflights was also rooted in the
Johnson administration's change in its whole approach to the war in
Indochina in the spring of 1968. On 31 March 1968, the President
limited the bombing of North Vietnam in order to improve the
chances for peace talks. The end of flights over
T-lwas viewed as another way to improve me peace process.
---"--9ereeat„
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.