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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 24 …Advanced Development Projects Division, Burbank. California. ED 129581.131011>10<25Yrs IS1 UNCLASSIFIED
  • p. 58 …Pedlow, Burbank, California, 26 August 1988. Sbc.et UNCLASSIFIED
  • p. 85 …how to transfer Lockheed employees from Burbank to Iwithout arousing a great deal of curiosity. The…
  • p. 273 …SP-1362, "History of the OXCART Program," Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, Burbank, CA. 1 July 1968, p…
  • p. 287 …designed trailer truck that carried it from Burbank By 18 November 1959, the mockup was in…
  • p. 297 …Construction began in September 1960; a C-47 shuttle service ferried work crews from Burbank to…
  • p. 299 …The plane left Burbank on 26 February 1962 and arrived at two days later. After the…
  • p. 304 …into the engine nacelles during assembly at Burbank were sucked into the power plant during initial…
12
The Lockheed CL-282
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Chapter 1
Development Planning. According to Wienberg, General LeMay
stood up halfway through the briefing, took his cigar out of his mouth,
and told the briefers that, if he wanted high-altitude photographs, he
would put cameras in his B-36 bombers and added that he was not
interested in a plane that had no wheels or guns. The general then left
the room, remarking that the whole business was a waste of his time."
Meanwhile, the CL-282 design proceeded through the Air Force
development channels and reached Major Seaberg at the Wright Air
Development Command in mid-May. Seaberg and his colleagues care-
fully evaluated the Lockheed submission and finally rejected it in early
June. One of their main reasons for doing so was Kelly Johnson's
choice of the unproven General Electric J73 engine. The engineers at
Wright Field considered the Pratt and Whitney J57 to be the most
powerful engine available, and the designs from Fairchild, Martin, and
Bell all incorporated this engine. The absence of conventional landing
gear was also a perceived shortcoming of the Lockheed design."'
Another factor in the rejection of Kelly Johnson's submission
was the Air Force preference for multiengine aircraft. Air Force re-
connaissance experts had gained their practical experience during
C. F. Wienberg. telephone conversation with Donald E. Welzenbach, 23 July 1988 (U).
" Miller. Lockheed U•2, p. 12.
ret
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.