“Lockheed”60+ pages
- p. 4 …Search for a New Reconnaissance Aircraft 8
Lockheed CL-282 Supporters and the CIA 13
Scientists…
- p. 6 …260
Competition Between Lockheed and Convair 267
The Selection of the Lockheed Design 270
Efforts To…
- p. 12 …excellent technical study of the U-2: Lockheed U-2
(1983).
E0129581.131d111>10<25Yrs…
- p. 21 …August 1953, OS1 records (S).
" Jay Miller, Lockheed U-2, Aerograph 3 (Austin, Texas: Aerofax, 1983…
- p. 22 …Immediately after returning to California, Carter proposed to
Lockheed Vice President L. Eugene Root (previously the…
- p. 23 …high-altitude
reconnaissance aircraft
Chapter 1
10
Lockheed also submit a design. Carter noted that the…
- p. 24 …Miller, Lockheed U-2, p. 12. For more details on Kelly Johnson's original proposal.
see…
- p. 25 12
The Lockheed CL-282
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Chapter 1
Development Planning. According to Wienberg, General LeMay…
- p. 26 …Despite the Air Force's selection
of the X-16, Lockheed continued to work on the…
- p. 27 …six days before the Wright Air Development Command
began to evaluate the Lockheed proposal. Gardner described…
- p. 28 …range are not as good as the
Lockheed CL-282.
Gardner's enthusiasm for the CL…
- p. 29 …Few details about Dulles's precise attitude
toward the proposed Lockheed reconnaissance aircraft are available,
but…
- p. 30 …At this point, the summer of 1954, Lockheed's CL-282 proposal
still lacked official support…
- p. 37 …ISP chairman Baker then urged Donovan to travel to
southern California to evaluate the Lockheed design…
- p. 39 …Thus, even though
the Lockheed CL-282 had several important sources of support by
September 1954…
- p. 40 …Council.46
Project Three Support for the Lockheed CL-282
Even before the final Technological Capabilities…
- p. 42 …Agency.49
Land learned the details of Lockheed's proposed CL-282 aircraft
soon after he…
- p. 43 …Chapter 1
30
briefly mention a Lockheed design for a high-flying aircraft at the
24…
- p. 44 …During September and October the Project Three study group
met frequently to discuss the Lockheed design…
- p. 47 …The Lockheed super glider will fly at 70,000 feet, well out of the
reach of…
- p. 48 …Putt, to oppose the adoption of the Lockheed design. The officials ar-
gued that the Bell…
- p. 49 …He used Gardner's
statement to convince Lockheed's senior management to approve the
project, which…
- p. 50 …small group of prominent scientists that the
Lockheed design represented the best possible overhead reconnais-
sance…
- p. 52 …afternoon of 3 December, they
Although the Lockheed CL-282 was not designated as the U…
- p. 53 …Eventually Bissell asked who was
going to pay for the airframes to be built by Lockheed…
- p. 55 …This category in-
cluded maintenance personnel from Lockheed (five per
aircraft), the pilots, and support personnel…
- p. 57 …Then on 22 December 1954, the Agency
signed a letter contract with Lockheed, using the codename…
- p. 58 …The U-2 would have a
The Lockheed "Skunk Works" was named after the Kickapoo Joy…
- p. 59 …Johnson, -A High-Altitude Reconnaissance Aircraft, - 9 December 1954,
Lockheed Contract Files, OSA Records (S).
UNCLASSIFIED
- p. 61 …Reconnaissance Aircraft, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation Report 10420. 28 January 1955.
pp. 7-9, OSA Recordsi \ (5…
- p. 63 …1954, even before the CIA adopted
the Lockheed proposal. Baker quickly recognized, however, that he
would…
- p. 69 …Miller, Lockheed U-2. pp. 19-20.
Sè'biet
UNCLASSIFIED
- p. 74 …aircraft—remained the ex-
clusive province of Lockheed:9
As a result of this agreement, CIA…
- p. 77 …The first model of the
pressure suit, used by Lockheed test pilots, made no provision for…
- p. 79 …Geary told Culbertson that the Lockheed
CL-282 was going to be known officially as the…
- p. 81 …former director of Lockheed's Skunk Works,
to Donald E. Welzenbach, 14 March 1986 (U): Miller…
- p. 84 …7 (TS Codeword); Miller, Lockheed U-2, p. 22.
OSA History, chap. 8, pp. 12-14…
- p. 85 …how to transfer Lockheed employees
from Burbank to Iwithout arousing a great deal of curiosity.
The…
- p. 88 …Colonel Yancey was in charge of six SAL pilots who were to be
trained by Lockheed…
- p. 90 …CIA, which then placed an order with
Lockheed for 29 U-2s in configurations to be…
- p. 107 …U-2
cover story stating that a Lockheed-developed aircraft would be flown
by the USAF…
- p. 143 …Lockheed mechanics
had mounted the various RAINBOW devices on the prototype U-2, a
Lockheed test…
- p. 144 …Unable to restart the power plant, Lockheed test pilot
Robert Sicker bailed out but was struck…
- p. 145 …The loss of one of Lockheed's best test pilots, as well as the pro-
totype…
- p. 157 …As a substitute,
Lockheed began working to develop a paint with radar-suppressant
qualities, but this…
- p. 162 …a series of tests over Edwards AFB. Lockheed began coating
the 11-2s with a standard…
- p. 188 …Although it haL refurbished by
Lockheed and now had the more powerful 175 engine that would…
- p. 200 …Beschloss claims that Powers was fired by Lockheed
for criticizing the Agency in his memoirs (which…
- p. 209 …Some poetic justice in this.'
One week later Colonel Geary called to order Lockheed to up…
- p. 211 …In May 1961, Lockheed began modifying Agency U-2s so that
they could be refueled in…
- p. 220 …story, which
was that its pilots were Lockheed employees on a ferry flight to
Puerto Rico…
- p. 230 …CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Chapter 5
Late in 1958, Lockheed began refitting the Agency's 13 remaining
U…
- p. 264 …1966 decided to place an order with Lockheed for ei g ht more aircraft
to be…
- p. 265 …Francis Gary Powers was one of the Lockheed test pilots who
checked out this new aircraft…
- p. 266 …began coming off the production line at Lockheed
in-the autumn of 1968, CIA and the…
- p. 273 …SP-1362, "History of the OXCART Program,"
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, Burbank, CA. 1 July 1968, p…
- p. 275 …Personnel at Lockheed's Skunk Works referred to
these aircraft concepts as "Archangel-1," "Archangel-2…
- p. 276 RN
Chapter 6
263
Johnson, "Archangel log," 17-24
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Lockheed design for a hydrogen…
- p. 280 …During the first half of 1959, both Lockheed and Convair
worked to reduce the radar cross…
- p. 281 …In early June, Lockheed submitted a design for a ground-launched
aircraft known as the A…
" Telephone conversation between DDC I Carter and Roswell Gilpatric, 12 October 1962.
DCI records. TS Codeword).
DDCI Marshall S. Carter
129581.61[11(11>10<25Yrs
IS)
Chapter 5
208
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Washington for California and did not return until 14 October. Air
Force control of the Cuban overflights became official on 12 October,
when President Kennedy transferred "responsibility, to include com-
mand and control and operational decisions, with regard to U-2 re-
connaissance overflights of Cuba" from the CIA to the Department of
Defense: 5 The Air Force then asked to borrow two of CIA's U-2Cs.
The Acting DCE, Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, US Army, reacted
strongly to the Air Force takeover of a major CIA operation. At one
point he remarked, "I think it's a hell of a way to run a railroad. It's
perfectly obviously a geared operation to get SAC in the act." 16 In a
series of conversations with high-ranking Air Force and administra-
tion officials. Carter argued against changing command and control of
the flights at such a crucial time. The Agency operation, Carter
pointed out, was already in place and working well, whereas the Air
Force lacked experience in controlling U-2 overflights, particularly
with the U-2C, which was not in the Air Force inventory. Carter also
emphasized that Air Force pilots lacked experience with the more
powerful 175 engines in the U-2C. He told Roswell Gilpatric, "To put
in a brand new green pilot just because he happens to have on a blue
suit and to completely disrupt the command and control and commu-
nication and ground support system on 72 hours' notice to me doesn't
make a God damn bit of sense, Mr. Secretary." ' 7 DDCI Carter admit-
ted that the Air Force's cover story was probably better than the CIA's
but suggested at one point, "Let's take one of my boys and put him in
a blue suit." 18 Realizing, however, that the pilot would probably have
to come from the Air Force, Carter concentrated his efforts on trying
to convince DOD and administration officials to conduct an orderly
transition by allowing the CIA to continue its operation for a few
weeks using an Air Force pilot, and the Air Force gradually taking
over command and control. Carter's efforts were in vain. The Air
Force insisted on immediate control of the operation, and administra-
tion officials were unwilling to become involved in what they
Memorandum for DCL NIcCone from McGeorge Bundy. "Reconnaissance Overflights
of Cuba," 12 October 1962. DC1 records1 ITS).
Telephone conversation between DDC I Carter and McGeorge Bundy, 13 October 1962.
DC1 records. TS Codeword).
" Telephone conversation between DDC1 Carter and Gen. William McKee, 12 October
1962. DC I records, (TS Codeword).
UNCLASSIFIED