Documents / FOIA release
This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.
“Edwards Air Force Base”5 pages
" Telephone conversation between DDC I Carter and Roswell Gilpatric, 12 October 1962. DCI records. TS Codeword). DDCI Marshall S. Carter 129581.61[11(11>10<25Yrs IS) Chapter 5 208 CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED Washington for California and did not return until 14 October. Air Force control of the Cuban overflights became official on 12 October, when President Kennedy transferred "responsibility, to include com- mand and control and operational decisions, with regard to U-2 re- connaissance overflights of Cuba" from the CIA to the Department of Defense: 5 The Air Force then asked to borrow two of CIA's U-2Cs. The Acting DCE, Lt. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, US Army, reacted strongly to the Air Force takeover of a major CIA operation. At one point he remarked, "I think it's a hell of a way to run a railroad. It's perfectly obviously a geared operation to get SAC in the act." 16 In a series of conversations with high-ranking Air Force and administra- tion officials. Carter argued against changing command and control of the flights at such a crucial time. The Agency operation, Carter pointed out, was already in place and working well, whereas the Air Force lacked experience in controlling U-2 overflights, particularly with the U-2C, which was not in the Air Force inventory. Carter also emphasized that Air Force pilots lacked experience with the more powerful 175 engines in the U-2C. He told Roswell Gilpatric, "To put in a brand new green pilot just because he happens to have on a blue suit and to completely disrupt the command and control and commu- nication and ground support system on 72 hours' notice to me doesn't make a God damn bit of sense, Mr. Secretary." ' 7 DDCI Carter admit- ted that the Air Force's cover story was probably better than the CIA's but suggested at one point, "Let's take one of my boys and put him in a blue suit." 18 Realizing, however, that the pilot would probably have to come from the Air Force, Carter concentrated his efforts on trying to convince DOD and administration officials to conduct an orderly transition by allowing the CIA to continue its operation for a few weeks using an Air Force pilot, and the Air Force gradually taking over command and control. Carter's efforts were in vain. The Air Force insisted on immediate control of the operation, and administra- tion officials were unwilling to become involved in what they Memorandum for DCL NIcCone from McGeorge Bundy. "Reconnaissance Overflights of Cuba," 12 October 1962. DC1 records1 ITS). Telephone conversation between DDC I Carter and McGeorge Bundy, 13 October 1962. DC1 records. TS Codeword). " Telephone conversation between DDC1 Carter and Gen. William McKee, 12 October 1962. DC I records, (TS Codeword). UNCLASSIFIED
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.