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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 4 …Scientists and Overhead Reconnaissance 17 The BEACON HILL Report 17 Concern About the Danger of a…
  • p. 14 …view of the "other side of the hill." With the advent of dry film, it became…
  • p. 30 …of this new advisory body." The BEACON HILL Report In 1951 the Air Force sought even…
  • p. 31 …Their head- quarters was located over a secretarial school on Beacon Hill, which soon became the…
  • p. 32 …to implement the ideas of the BEACON HILL Report until the summer of 1953. By this…
  • p. 34 …Created in July 1953, the Intelligence Systems Panel (ISP) included several experts from the BEACON HILL…
  • p. 37 …reconnais- sance needs expressed in the BEACON HILL Report. Theoretically, he explained to the panel, any…
  • p. 41 …H. T. Friis R. Mettler A. G. Hill E. Purcell W. H. Radford E. H. Plesset…
  • p. 44 …6(dli1i>10<25Yrs since the BEACON HILL and Intelligence Systems Panel meetings. (Si James Baker…
  • p. 45 …Having participated in the BEACON HILL Study and the Intelligence Systems Panel, several Project Three members…
  • p. 344 …He headed the Beacon Hill Panel in 1952 and later became director of Lincoln Laboratories. PARANGOSKY…
  • p. 345 …of several advisory panels, including the BEACON HILL project. He helped Baker decide what cameras to…
  • p. 364 …BEACON HILL Report: Problems of Air Force Intelligence and Reconnaissance. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 15 June…
Chapter 1
9
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
produce a better aircraft more quickly. In July 1953, the Bell Aircraft
Corporation of Buffalo, New York, and the Fairchild Engine and
Airplane Corporation of Hagerstown, Maryland, received study con-
tracts to develop an entirely new high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft.
In addition, the Glenn L. Martin Company of Baltimore was asked to
examine the possibility of improving the already exceptional high-al-
titude performance of the B-57 Canberra. By January 1954 all three
firms had submitted their proposals. Fairchild's entry was a single-en-
gine plane known as M-195, which had a maximum altitude potential
of 67,200 feet; Bell's was a twin-engine craft called the Model 67
(later the X-I6), which had a maximum altitude of 69,500 feet; and
Martin's design was a big-wing version of the B-57 called the Model
294, which was to cruise at 64,000 feet. In March 1954, Seaberg and
other engineers at Wright Field, having evaluated the three contend-
ing designs, recommended the adoption of both the Martin and Bell
proposals. They considered Martin's version of the 8-57 an interim
project that could be completed and deployed rapidly while the more
advanced concept from Bell was still being developed.''
Air Force headquarters soon approved Martin's proposal to mod-
ify- the B-57 and was very much interested in the Bell design. But
word of the competition for a new reconnaissance airplane had
reached another aircraft manufacturer, the Lockheed Aircraft
Corporation, which submitted an unsolicited design.
Lockheed had first become aware of the reconnaissance aircraft
competition in the fall of 1953. John H. (Jack) Carter, who had
recently retired from the Air Force to become the assistant director
of Lockheed's Advanced Development Program, was in the Pentagon
on business and dropped in to see Eugene P. Kiefer, an old friend
and colleague from the Air Force's Office of Development Planning
(more commonly known as AFDAP from its Air Force office
symbol). Kiefer told Carter about the competition for a high-flying
aircraft and expressed the opinion that the Air Force was going about
the search in the wrong way by requiring the new aircraft to be suit-
able for both strategic and tactical reconnaissance.
Immediately after returning to California, Carter proposed to
Lockheed Vice President L. Eugene Root (previously the top civilian
official in the Air Force's Office of Development Planning) that
The request for proposal, known as "Design Study Requirements. identification No.
53WC-I6507," has been reprinted in Miller, Lockheed U-2. pp. 10-11.
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.