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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 9 …The struggle between the CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and…
  • p. 72 …2 missions. Access to the photographs taken by the U-2 would be strictly controlled, which…
  • p. 73 …This pact gave the Air Force responsibility for pilot selection and training, weather information, mission plotting…
  • p. 81 …Before the start of a mission, the ground crew set the counters to indicate the total…
  • p. 96 …All of the products from this project would be placed in the new control sys- tem…
  • p. 100 …This was an S-band radar used by Soviet forces for early warning and ground-controlled…
  • p. 113 …The President nevertheless maintained tight control over the program and authorized only 10 days of overflights…
  • p. 128 …the following day, whithi next U-2 mission returned from the Middle East. After quickly developing…
  • p. 140 …Welzenbach (S); Mission folder 4020 (18 Marcn n, CJJA rerar9 ITS Codeword). OSA History. chap. 4…
  • p. 142 …of the first series of U-2 missions as condu this research under a project codenamed…
  • p. 147 …not an easy task in crowded Japan.`) Detachment C began conducting missions in June 1957 after…
  • p. 191 …This revised cover story, along with a mission flight plan consistent with it, was sent to…
  • p. 196 …with Abel's "wife" (probably his Soviet control) in East Germany. In November 1961, Acting DCI…
  • p. 204 …in-the DDP in order to maintain control of his overhead reconnais- sance projects (the U…
  • p. 220 …Strongly favoring Air Force control of the U-2 missions over Cuba. the DOD representatives called…
  • p. 335 …The flood of information that the U-2 missions gathered led to a major expansion of…
  • p. 340 …In 1959 Bissell became Deputy Director for Plans but kept the reconnaissance projects under his control…
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005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
—STEret-P4Q4C1BN
Chapter 4
190
Most military reconnaissance missions were approved or disap-
proved at the JCS level, but the most sensitive missions were submit-
ted through the Secretary of Defense to the Special Group for
approval. In addition to this Department of Defense approval path, the
military services could also submit requirements through the DCI us-
ing their representatives on COMOR. As a result, the military ser-
vices had two channels for submitting reconnaissance missions to the
Special Group. The Agency had only one—COMOR."
The main conflicts between the requirements committee and the
military services arose over missions in the Far East. In the early
1960s. North Vietnam had not been designated a denied area by the
US Intelligence Board (USIB), so the military services could plan
missions there without consulting COMOR. Such missions, however,
came very close to China, which was a denied area and, therefore,
came under COMOR's area of responsibility. Once the war in
Southeast Asia escalated in 1964, the military services received re-
sponsibility for the entire area (see chapter 5).
To reduce the number of disputes between the competing CIA
and Air Force reconnaissance programs and to manage the growing
satellite program, the two agencies worked out an agreement to pro-
vide overall coordination for reconnaissance activities at the national
level. The first such interagency agreement came in the fall of 1961,
and it was followed by three additional agreements durin g the next
four years.'4
Interest in coordinating the reconnaissance efforts of the military
services and the CIA also affected the field of photographic interpre-
tation. In the wake of the loss of Francis Gary Powers' U-2 on 1 May
1960, the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence
Activities (PFIAB) had urged the establishment of an interagency
group to study ways to improve the entire US intelligence community.
Formed on 6 May 1960, the Joint Study Group on Foreign
Intelligence Activities met for the next seven months under the lead-
ership of Lyman Kirkpatrick, CIA Inspector General. One of the
study group's key recommendations in the report it issued in
December 1960 was the creation of a national photointerpretation
" [bid (TS Codeword).
Problems of classification prevent a more detailed discussion of this aspect of the recon-
naissance program, which will be covered in a future history of satellite reconnaissance at
a hieher level of classification.
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.