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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 12 …later, at press conferences in February and July 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson revealed the existence…
  • p. 40 …MIT Press. 1977), p. 68: Beschloss, Maplay, p. 74: TCP Report. pp. 185-186 (S). UNCLASSIFIED
  • p. 98 …The Soviet Union sent strongly worded protest notes to the United States and the nations from…
  • p. 102 …not only press releases and the public line to be taken, but also the suspension of…
  • p. 107 …The "provisional" designation gave the U-2 detachments greater security because provisional Air Force units did…
  • p. 112 …at a press conference that the Soviet Union might be ahead of the United States in…
  • p. 125 …Dial Press, 1982), pp. 45-47. Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword). UNCLASSIFIED
  • p. 174 …McElroy stressed that the gap would be temporary and that at its end the United States…
  • p. 195 …in the press about the presence of "spyplanes" on Japanese territory, asked the United States to…
  • p. 198 …DCI records (S). " United States Congress, Senate. Foreign Relations Committee, Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign…
  • p. 307 …By 1962 the United States had become aware of the effectiveness of a new Soviet radar…
  • p. 315 …To preserve the secrecy of the OXCART program, the Air Force informed the press that an…
  • p. 328 …at times when the press and Congress alleged that the United States was falling behind the…
  • p. 362 …MIT Press, 1977. Kistiakowsky. George B. A Scientist at the White House. Cambridge: Harvard University Press…
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Chapter 4
189
denied areas, whether by photographic, ELINT. COMINT, infrared,
RADINT, or other means." The only exception to COMOR's area of
responsibility was "reconnaissance and aerial surveillance in direct
support of actively combatant forces." 5'
By this time the Air Force had developed a large overhead re-
connaissance program of its own, including a fleet of U-2s, and, occa-
sionally, there were conflicts between the areas of responsibility of
COMOR and the military services for collection requirements. The
Air Force had already won a major victory in 1958, when it claimed
that the White House had given responsibility for peripheral recon-
naissance of the Soviet Union to the military. DCI Dulles, who was
always reluctant to become involved in matters that seemed to lie in
the military's area of responsibility, did not resist this claim, and the
Ad Hoc Requirements Committee stopped preparing requirements for
peripheral flights. This ended a major requirements committee study,
which sought to estimate what could be gained from U-2 oblique pho-
tography along the entire border of the Soviet Union. 5 The last CIA
U-2 mission along the Soviet Union's coasts occurred on 22 June
.1958: thereafter, the only peripheral missions conducted by the CIA
were those along the Soviet Union':s
Until the spring of 1961, there was virtually no coordination of
military reconnaissance activities, even within the individual services.
Each commander of a Theater or a Unified and Specified Command
conducted his own independent reconnaissance activities. To meet the
growing need for overall coordination of these activities at the na-
tional level, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) established the Joint
Reconnaissance Center (JRC) under the J-3 (Operations) of the Joint
Staff. The JRC immediately began to coordinate and obtain approval
for approximately 500 missions per month. assigning each a risk fac-
tor of Critical, Sensitive, Unique. or Routine. The JRC then prepared
a monthly Activities Book giving details of the proposed missions
and briefed the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the more risky missions. The
CIA received a copy of the Activities Book.
" DOD 217, effective 9 August 1960 (S).
Memorandum for DCI McCone from James Q. Reber, Chairman. COMOR. "Proposed
Procedures for Approval of Critical Reconnaissance." 21 March 1962, COMIREX records
(TS Codesvord).
UNCLASSIFIED
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.