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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 9 …The struggle between the CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and…
  • p. 72 …2 missions. Access to the photographs taken by the U-2 would be strictly controlled, which…
  • p. 73 …This pact gave the Air Force responsibility for pilot selection and training, weather information, mission plotting…
  • p. 81 …Before the start of a mission, the ground crew set the counters to indicate the total…
  • p. 96 …All of the products from this project would be placed in the new control sys- tem…
  • p. 100 …This was an S-band radar used by Soviet forces for early warning and ground-controlled…
  • p. 113 …The President nevertheless maintained tight control over the program and authorized only 10 days of overflights…
  • p. 128 …the following day, whithi next U-2 mission returned from the Middle East. After quickly developing…
  • p. 140 …Welzenbach (S); Mission folder 4020 (18 Marcn n, CJJA rerar9 ITS Codeword). OSA History. chap. 4…
  • p. 142 …of the first series of U-2 missions as condu this research under a project codenamed…
  • p. 147 …not an easy task in crowded Japan.`) Detachment C began conducting missions in June 1957 after…
  • p. 191 …This revised cover story, along with a mission flight plan consistent with it, was sent to…
  • p. 196 …with Abel's "wife" (probably his Soviet control) in East Germany. In November 1961, Acting DCI…
  • p. 204 …in-the DDP in order to maintain control of his overhead reconnais- sance projects (the U…
  • p. 220 …Strongly favoring Air Force control of the U-2 missions over Cuba. the DOD representatives called…
  • p. 335 …The flood of information that the U-2 missions gathered led to a major expansion of…
  • p. 340 …In 1959 Bissell became Deputy Director for Plans but kept the reconnaissance projects under his control…
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Chapter 4
189
denied areas, whether by photographic, ELINT. COMINT, infrared,
RADINT, or other means." The only exception to COMOR's area of
responsibility was "reconnaissance and aerial surveillance in direct
support of actively combatant forces." 5'
By this time the Air Force had developed a large overhead re-
connaissance program of its own, including a fleet of U-2s, and, occa-
sionally, there were conflicts between the areas of responsibility of
COMOR and the military services for collection requirements. The
Air Force had already won a major victory in 1958, when it claimed
that the White House had given responsibility for peripheral recon-
naissance of the Soviet Union to the military. DCI Dulles, who was
always reluctant to become involved in matters that seemed to lie in
the military's area of responsibility, did not resist this claim, and the
Ad Hoc Requirements Committee stopped preparing requirements for
peripheral flights. This ended a major requirements committee study,
which sought to estimate what could be gained from U-2 oblique pho-
tography along the entire border of the Soviet Union. 5 The last CIA
U-2 mission along the Soviet Union's coasts occurred on 22 June
.1958: thereafter, the only peripheral missions conducted by the CIA
were those along the Soviet Union':s
Until the spring of 1961, there was virtually no coordination of
military reconnaissance activities, even within the individual services.
Each commander of a Theater or a Unified and Specified Command
conducted his own independent reconnaissance activities. To meet the
growing need for overall coordination of these activities at the na-
tional level, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) established the Joint
Reconnaissance Center (JRC) under the J-3 (Operations) of the Joint
Staff. The JRC immediately began to coordinate and obtain approval
for approximately 500 missions per month. assigning each a risk fac-
tor of Critical, Sensitive, Unique. or Routine. The JRC then prepared
a monthly Activities Book giving details of the proposed missions
and briefed the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the more risky missions. The
CIA received a copy of the Activities Book.
" DOD 217, effective 9 August 1960 (S).
Memorandum for DCI McCone from James Q. Reber, Chairman. COMOR. "Proposed
Procedures for Approval of Critical Reconnaissance." 21 March 1962, COMIREX records
(TS Codesvord).
UNCLASSIFIED
E0 12958 1.6191111>1010<25Yrs
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.