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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 24 …Instead of a conventional landing gear, Johnson proposed using two skis and a reinforced belly rib…
  • p. 25 …a perceived shortcoming of the Lockheed design."' Another factor in the rejection of Kelly Johnson's…
  • p. 26 …interview by Donald E. Welzenbach, Corona del Mar. California. 20 May 1985 (S). Johnson, "Log for…
  • p. 27 …Gardner described Kelly Johnson's proposal and showed the drawings to Strong. After this meeting. Strong…
  • p. 30 …To make Kelly Johnson's revolutionary design a reality, one additional source of support was necessary…
  • p. 42 …When James Killian asked Land to head Project Three, Land had to make a major decision…
  • p. 48 …do the job in Johnson's airplane. And further, 1 overlaid a curve showing that with…
  • p. 57 …demanding, and Kelly Johnson agreed that such a move would save a lot of money. Lockheed…
  • p. 58 …a week after he had been authorized to begin the project, Kelly Johnson wrote a 23…
  • p. 69 …project staff) flew LIZ with Kelly Johnson in a small Beechcraft plane piloted by eed's…
  • p. 72 …This responsibility has placed a heavy burden on the Office of Security for establishing procedures to…
  • p. 79 …Batlin suggested the method used by Nazi war criminal Hermann Goering, a thin glass ampule containing…
  • p. 81 …Kelly Johnson used a "wet-wing" design for the U-2, which meant that fuel was…
  • p. 89 …Airspeed was such a critical factor that Kelly Johnson added a vernier adjustment to the throttle…
  • p. 162 …By late 1957, Johnson agreed that something had to be done. After a series of tests…
  • p. 276 RN Chapter 6 263 Johnson, "Archangel log," 17-24 CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED Lockheed design for a hydrogen…
  • p. 324 …OXCART did win a temporary reprieve in late November 1967. The Johnson administration decided to keep…
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
Chapter 4
189
denied areas, whether by photographic, ELINT. COMINT, infrared,
RADINT, or other means." The only exception to COMOR's area of
responsibility was "reconnaissance and aerial surveillance in direct
support of actively combatant forces." 5'
By this time the Air Force had developed a large overhead re-
connaissance program of its own, including a fleet of U-2s, and, occa-
sionally, there were conflicts between the areas of responsibility of
COMOR and the military services for collection requirements. The
Air Force had already won a major victory in 1958, when it claimed
that the White House had given responsibility for peripheral recon-
naissance of the Soviet Union to the military. DCI Dulles, who was
always reluctant to become involved in matters that seemed to lie in
the military's area of responsibility, did not resist this claim, and the
Ad Hoc Requirements Committee stopped preparing requirements for
peripheral flights. This ended a major requirements committee study,
which sought to estimate what could be gained from U-2 oblique pho-
tography along the entire border of the Soviet Union. 5 The last CIA
U-2 mission along the Soviet Union's coasts occurred on 22 June
.1958: thereafter, the only peripheral missions conducted by the CIA
were those along the Soviet Union':s
Until the spring of 1961, there was virtually no coordination of
military reconnaissance activities, even within the individual services.
Each commander of a Theater or a Unified and Specified Command
conducted his own independent reconnaissance activities. To meet the
growing need for overall coordination of these activities at the na-
tional level, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) established the Joint
Reconnaissance Center (JRC) under the J-3 (Operations) of the Joint
Staff. The JRC immediately began to coordinate and obtain approval
for approximately 500 missions per month. assigning each a risk fac-
tor of Critical, Sensitive, Unique. or Routine. The JRC then prepared
a monthly Activities Book giving details of the proposed missions
and briefed the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the more risky missions. The
CIA received a copy of the Activities Book.
" DOD 217, effective 9 August 1960 (S).
Memorandum for DCI McCone from James Q. Reber, Chairman. COMOR. "Proposed
Procedures for Approval of Critical Reconnaissance." 21 March 1962, COMIREX records
(TS Codesvord).
UNCLASSIFIED
E0 12958 1.6191111>1010<25Yrs
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.