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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 24 …Instead of a conventional landing gear, Johnson proposed using two skis and a reinforced belly rib…
  • p. 25 …a perceived shortcoming of the Lockheed design."' Another factor in the rejection of Kelly Johnson's…
  • p. 26 …interview by Donald E. Welzenbach, Corona del Mar. California. 20 May 1985 (S). Johnson, "Log for…
  • p. 27 …Gardner described Kelly Johnson's proposal and showed the drawings to Strong. After this meeting. Strong…
  • p. 30 …To make Kelly Johnson's revolutionary design a reality, one additional source of support was necessary…
  • p. 42 …When James Killian asked Land to head Project Three, Land had to make a major decision…
  • p. 48 …do the job in Johnson's airplane. And further, 1 overlaid a curve showing that with…
  • p. 57 …demanding, and Kelly Johnson agreed that such a move would save a lot of money. Lockheed…
  • p. 58 …a week after he had been authorized to begin the project, Kelly Johnson wrote a 23…
  • p. 69 …project staff) flew LIZ with Kelly Johnson in a small Beechcraft plane piloted by eed's…
  • p. 72 …This responsibility has placed a heavy burden on the Office of Security for establishing procedures to…
  • p. 79 …Batlin suggested the method used by Nazi war criminal Hermann Goering, a thin glass ampule containing…
  • p. 81 …Kelly Johnson used a "wet-wing" design for the U-2, which meant that fuel was…
  • p. 89 …Airspeed was such a critical factor that Kelly Johnson added a vernier adjustment to the throttle…
  • p. 162 …By late 1957, Johnson agreed that something had to be done. After a series of tests…
  • p. 276 RN Chapter 6 263 Johnson, "Archangel log," 17-24 CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED Lockheed design for a hydrogen…
  • p. 324 …OXCART did win a temporary reprieve in late November 1967. The Johnson administration decided to keep…
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
NOP:MN
Chapter 4
188
became more formal as the National Security Council became
involved. Henceforth, proposed missions had to be submitted to the
National Security Council (NSC) Special Group for approval. In the
early 1960s, the Special Group consisted of the DCI, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of State, and the Military
Adviser to the President. After the Military Adviser, Gen. Maxwell
Taylor, became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1962, his
place on the Special Group was taken by McGeorge Bundy, the
President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs:"
Before requesting permission from the Special Group for a U-2
mission over denied territory, the CIA prepared a detailed submission
giving justification for the proposed mission and maps showing the
targets to be photographed, flight times, and emergency landing sites.
Such submissions came to be known as "black books" because they
were placed in black, looseleaf binders. The decision of the Special
Group was generally final, althou g h on occasion controversial issues
were presented to the President for his decision.
This approval process did not come into play immediately after
May 1960 because there was a long pause in U-2 operations as the
detachments returned from overseas. It was not until late October
1960 that the next U-2 operation occurred, this time over Cuba. By
this time the full approval procedure had been established, and the
Special Group approved the mission (see chapter 5).
The approval process was not the only part of the U-2 program
that changed after May 1960. The process for establishing require-
ments for overhead reconnaissance missions also became more for-
mal. In August 1960 the US Intelli gence Board took over the Ad Hoc
Requirements Committee and merged it with the Satellite Intelligence
Requirements Committee to form the Committee on Overhead
Reconnaissance. DCI Directive 2/7 tasked COMOR with the "coor-
dinated development of foreign intelligence requirements for
overhead-reconnaissance projects over denied areas." The DCID
defined "overhead reconnaissance" to include "all reconnaissance
for forei g n-intelligence purposes by satellite, or by any vehicle over
The Special Group, which had been created by NSC Intelligence Document 5412/2 in
1955 to oversee coven activities, was originally known as the 5412 Committee. Later the
Special Group became known as the 303 Committee and then the 40 Committee. United
States Congress, Senate. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities, Foreign and Military Intelligence. book I. (Washington,
DC: US Government Printin g Office, 1976). pp. 48-53.
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.