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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 223 …Rudolph Anderson. This loss again illustrated the U-2's vulnerability to the SA-2 missile…
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Chapter 4
187
005653421 UNCLASSIFIED
the U-2 project under the title Operation Overflight. Later he flew a
light plane as a traffic reporter for a Los Angeles radio station and
then a helicopter for a television station. On 1 August 1977, he and a
cameraman from the station died when his helicopter crashed on the
way to an assignmenC
CHANGES IN OVERFLIGHT PROCEDURES
AFTER MAY 1960
One of the most important changes in the overflight program after the
loss of Francis Gary Powers' U-2 was the institution of more formal
procedures for the approval of U-2 missions. Durin g, the first four
years of U-2 activity, very few members of the Eisenhower adminis-
tration had been involved in making decisions concerning the over-
flight program. The President personally authorized all tlights over
the Soviet Union and was consulted by Richard Bissell and either the
DCI or the DDCI about each such proposed mission. In addition to
CIA officials, the President's discussions of individual U-2 missions
or of the program as a whole generally included the Secretary of State
or his Under Secretary, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs_of Staff, the
Secretary of Defense or his deputy, and the President's secretary.
Colonel (later General) Goodpaster.
The approval process under President Eisenhower was thus very
unstructured. There was no formal approval body charged with re-
viewing overflight proposals; the President kept this authority in his
hands and simply consulted with selected cabinet officials and advis-
ers before reaching a decision.
E0129581.61dlill>101010<25Yrs
IS1
The loss of Powers' U-2 in May 1960 led to major changes in
the approval process. I-
Ithe approval process
Beschloss. Mayday, pp. 396-401. Beschloss claims that Powers was fired by Lockheed
for criticizing the Agency in his memoirs (which he had shown to the Agency in draft
form), but Kelly Johnson's "U-2R Log - records on 25 September 1969: "We have no
flight test activity at all. I must let Gary Powers go. Have protected him for about seven
years. but he doesn't have an AIR (Air Transport Rating), so we have no other job for
him—not even Hying the Beechcraft."
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.