Documents / FOIA release

/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 4 …Scientists and Overhead Reconnaissance 17 The BEACON HILL Report 17 Concern About the Danger of a…
  • p. 14 …view of the "other side of the hill." With the advent of dry film, it became…
  • p. 30 …of this new advisory body." The BEACON HILL Report In 1951 the Air Force sought even…
  • p. 31 …Their head- quarters was located over a secretarial school on Beacon Hill, which soon became the…
  • p. 32 …to implement the ideas of the BEACON HILL Report until the summer of 1953. By this…
  • p. 34 …Created in July 1953, the Intelligence Systems Panel (ISP) included several experts from the BEACON HILL…
  • p. 37 …reconnais- sance needs expressed in the BEACON HILL Report. Theoretically, he explained to the panel, any…
  • p. 41 …H. T. Friis R. Mettler A. G. Hill E. Purcell W. H. Radford E. H. Plesset…
  • p. 44 …6(dli1i>10<25Yrs since the BEACON HILL and Intelligence Systems Panel meetings. (Si James Baker…
  • p. 45 …Having participated in the BEACON HILL Study and the Intelligence Systems Panel, several Project Three members…
  • p. 344 …He headed the Beacon Hill Panel in 1952 and later became director of Lincoln Laboratories. PARANGOSKY…
  • p. 345 …of several advisory panels, including the BEACON HILL project. He helped Baker decide what cameras to…
  • p. 364 …BEACON HILL Report: Problems of Air Force Intelligence and Reconnaissance. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 15 June…
179
CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED
This statement had been prepared for a "best case" scenario, that
is to say, one in which neither the pilot nor the plane and film sur-
vived. However, pilots had bailed out from extremely high altitudes
and survived, and there was even evidence from previous U-2 crashes
that much of the aircraft itself could be salvaged. The small destruc-
tive charge aboard the U-2 was not sufficient to destroy much more
than the camera. The tightly rolled film, which could reveal the exact
purpose of the mission even if the pilot and aircraft did not survive,
was very hard to destroy. Kelly Johnson later conducted an experi-
ment that revealed film taken out of a completely burned-out aircraft
could still provide usable imagery." After almost four years of suc-
cessful U-2 missions, Richard Bissell and the rest of the Development
Projects Division had become overconfident and were not prepared
for the -worst case" scenario that actually occurred in May 1960.
This failure played directly into the hands of Soviet Premier Nikita
Khrushchev, who shrewdly decided to release information about the
downed U-2 a little at a time, thereby encouraging the United States
to stick with its vulnerable cover story too long. As he later wrote,
"Our intention here was to confuse the government circles of the
United States. As long as the Americans thought the pilot was dead,
they would keep putting out the story that perhaps the plane had acci-
dentally strayed off course and been shot down in the mountains on
the Soviet side of the border." '4 The first word from the Soviet Union
came on Thursday, 5 May, when Premier Khrushchev announced to a
meeting of the Supreme Soviet that a US "spyplane" had been
downed near Sverdlovsk. He made no mention of the fate of its pilot.
Khrushchev's announcement aroused considerable interest in the
media in the United States, and that same day the State Department
and NASA issued another statement that continued the "weather
plane" cover story, adding that the pilot became lost during a routine
mission near the Caucasus Mountains. Soon afterward, the US
Ambassador to Moscow cabled a report to the State Department indi-
cating that the pilot might be alive after all. Two days later, on 7 May
1960, Khrushchev confirmed this report by revealing that the U-2 pi-
lot was alive and had admitted his mission of spying on the Soviet
Union.
" Geary interview.
Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, p. 507.
Se et
UNCLASSIFIED

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.