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/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 18 …This search soon led him to a British twin-engine medium bomber— the Canberra—built by…
  • p. 19 CO5653421 UNCLASSIFIED ."-ge""011-141 Chapter 1 6 '• Q.., ./ • „„, a • • ..a■ ...A • - at -... .441 RAF Canberra…
  • p. 22 …al- titude performance of the B-57 Canberra. By January 1954 all three firms had submitted…
  • p. 36 …The RAF equipped the new Canberra PR7 with Rolls- Royce Avon-109 engines and gave it…
  • p. 37 …altitude flight being made to the US Canberra, the B-57.3' The Intelligence Systems Panel…
  • p. 80 …production was needed to power specially configured Canberra RB-57Ds for the Air Force. The first…
  • p. 122 …a reconnaissance version of the twin-engine Canberra bomber, similar to the RAF overflight of Kapustin…
  • p. 175 …2 and an Air Force RB-57D Canberra. The two air- craft cruised along the Soviet…
--Geoost-ALIDEQUAL
Chapter 4
174
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of Soviet ICBM sites. The other proposed overflight, Operation TIME
STEP out of Greenland, was more likely to run into bad weather
(which would affect both navigation and photography) because the
tlightpath would remain above 60° north latitude during the entire
mission. Furthermore, mission planners opposed this route because of
its greater risk. In his letter to Richard Bissell on 14 March 1960,
tated:
Operation "TIME STEP" is our last choice because we can as-
sume, with a 90 percent probability of being correct, that we will
be detected on entry, tracked accurately throughout the period in
denied territory (approximately four hours), and will evoke a
strong PV0 [Soviet Air Defense] reaction. This flight plan would
permit alerting of SAM sites, and pre-positioning of missile
equipped fighters in the Murmansk area (point of exit) thus
enhancing the possibility of successful intercept. In addition, we
must assume that even were the Soviets unable to physicall y in-
terfere with such an incursion, sufficient evidence will be avail-
able to permit them to document a diplomatic protest should they
desire to do so.15
The concerns raised by about TIME STEP should
also have been raised about tJation ND SLAM, which would
be the most adventuresome overflight to date because it proposed
covering so much of the Soviet Union. If the Soviets could track the
U-2 early in the mission, they would have plenty of time to prepare to
intercept the aircraft.
The pilot selected for Operation GRAND SLAM was Francis
Gary Powers, the most experienced U-2 pilot in the program. Powers
had joined the project in May 1956 and had flown 27 operational mis-
sions in the U-2. including one each over the Soviet Union and China
as well as six along the Soviet border.
To prevent the U-2 from being seen project manag-
ers decided to ferry the aircraft from the night be-
fore the scheduled flight. Once the p ane was refueled and its camera
was loaded, it would take off at daybreak, with little if any exposure
to local residents because of darkness and its short stay—less than six
Memorandum for Richard M. Bissell. Deputy Director (Plans). from
1;;I cting Chief. DPD, "E‘aluation of Proposed CHALICE Operations.' 14 N1arc1i
IStaff, COMIREX records,' 1CHALICE (General)" (TS
Codeword).
UNCLASSIFIED

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.