Documents / FOIA release

/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 4 …Intelligence Systems Panel 21 British Overflight of Kapustin Yar 23 The Intelligence Systems Panel and the…
  • p. 29 …Operations Staff, OSI, "Overflight of Kapustin Yar." 15 October 1954, OSI (OSWR) records TS, down- graded…
  • p. 36 …British Overflight of Kapustin Yar The British were also working on high-altitude reconnaissance air- craft…
  • p. 37 …its members about the British overflight of Kapustin Yar because they were not cleared for this…
  • p. 122 …bomber, similar to the RAF overflight of Kapustin Yar in 1953. The US reply, sent to…
  • p. 152 …This facility was used to test radars against incoming missiles fired from Kapustin Yar, 1,400…
Chapter 4
167
ED 129581.6[Ull>101010le<25Yrs
[Si
the Soviet Union.\
'the excellent pnotograpny Tram
this mission did not reveal a single missile site, but analysts did dis-. . -
cover a new Soviet bomber, dubbed the BACKFIN, at Kazan'.16
Despite the outcome of this mission, the missile-gap debate con-
tinued. The Air Force still insisted that the Soviets had deployed as
many as 100 missiles. The Army, Navy, and CIA, however, doubted
that any had been deployed, because none could be found. Additional
U-2 photography was needed to settle the debate. In mid-February,
President Eisenhower reviewed plans for four additional U-2 mis-
sions.
ma se t e rest ent more wi mg to coast e
and he agreed to allow one mission to be
flown aunng me momn 01 ivlarch. The President's continued restric-
tions upon the use of the U-2 disturbed DCI Dulles, who sent a memo-
randum to the National Security Council on 1 March 1960 asserting
that the cardinal objective of obtaining information on Soviet missile
deployment could be better achieved if the U-2 were given freer rein:7
" Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President, p. 568; Beschloss, Mayday, p. 233.
Mission folder 8009 (5 February 1960), OSA records. TS
Codeword); OSA Chronology, p. 23 (TS Codeword).
OSA Chronology. p. 25 (TS Codeword)1 /-The President's Board:
1956-60. - Studies in Intelligence 13 (Summer 19691:118 (3).
UNCLASSIFIED

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.