Documents / FOIA release

/specialCollection/MissileGap/1992/1992-04-01.pdf

Central Intelligence Agency · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a CIA History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach, published in Washington in 1992 and approved for release in 2011. It covers the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, which developed and flew the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART. It traces the U-2's development, the overflights of the Soviet Union, the downing of Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960, and later operations. One section is titled U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK.

  • p. 4 …Scientists and Overhead Reconnaissance 17 The BEACON HILL Report 17 Concern About the Danger of a…
  • p. 14 …view of the "other side of the hill." With the advent of dry film, it became…
  • p. 30 …of this new advisory body." The BEACON HILL Report In 1951 the Air Force sought even…
  • p. 31 …Their head- quarters was located over a secretarial school on Beacon Hill, which soon became the…
  • p. 32 …to implement the ideas of the BEACON HILL Report until the summer of 1953. By this…
  • p. 34 …Created in July 1953, the Intelligence Systems Panel (ISP) included several experts from the BEACON HILL…
  • p. 37 …reconnais- sance needs expressed in the BEACON HILL Report. Theoretically, he explained to the panel, any…
  • p. 41 …H. T. Friis R. Mettler A. G. Hill E. Purcell W. H. Radford E. H. Plesset…
  • p. 44 …6(dli1i>10<25Yrs since the BEACON HILL and Intelligence Systems Panel meetings. (Si James Baker…
  • p. 45 …Having participated in the BEACON HILL Study and the Intelligence Systems Panel, several Project Three members…
  • p. 344 …He headed the Beacon Hill Panel in 1952 and later became director of Lincoln Laboratories. PARANGOSKY…
  • p. 345 …of several advisory panels, including the BEACON HILL project. He helped Baker decide what cameras to…
  • p. 364 …BEACON HILL Report: Problems of Air Force Intelligence and Reconnaissance. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 15 June…
Chapter 4
167
ED 129581.6[Ull>101010le<25Yrs
[Si
the Soviet Union.\
'the excellent pnotograpny Tram
this mission did not reveal a single missile site, but analysts did dis-. . -
cover a new Soviet bomber, dubbed the BACKFIN, at Kazan'.16
Despite the outcome of this mission, the missile-gap debate con-
tinued. The Air Force still insisted that the Soviets had deployed as
many as 100 missiles. The Army, Navy, and CIA, however, doubted
that any had been deployed, because none could be found. Additional
U-2 photography was needed to settle the debate. In mid-February,
President Eisenhower reviewed plans for four additional U-2 mis-
sions.
ma se t e rest ent more wi mg to coast e
and he agreed to allow one mission to be
flown aunng me momn 01 ivlarch. The President's continued restric-
tions upon the use of the U-2 disturbed DCI Dulles, who sent a memo-
randum to the National Security Council on 1 March 1960 asserting
that the cardinal objective of obtaining information on Soviet missile
deployment could be better achieved if the U-2 were given freer rein:7
" Ambrose, Eisenhower: The President, p. 568; Beschloss, Mayday, p. 233.
Mission folder 8009 (5 February 1960), OSA records. TS
Codeword); OSA Chronology, p. 23 (TS Codeword).
OSA Chronology. p. 25 (TS Codeword)1 /-The President's Board:
1956-60. - Studies in Intelligence 13 (Summer 19691:118 (3).
UNCLASSIFIED

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.